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INTRODUCTION 
In December 2012, China’s legislature took the 
unprecedented step of amending its Labor Contract Law 
(“LCL”)1 only four years after its enactment.2 The amendments, 
which took effect in 2013, are limited in scope and address only 
a few provisions of the LCL—those governing the use of workers 
sourced from labor services agencies and the regulation of those 
agencies (referred to herein as “temp agencies”).3 The reforms 
are important in part because they deepen long-term trends in 
China toward tighter regulations and higher labor costs. 
Curiously, though perhaps not surprisingly, they are also 
intended, in part, to secure protections that have been a focus of 
Chinese labor law reform since China’s first nation-level Labor 

1. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Hetong Fa (୰⋶Ṣ㮹ℙ␴⚥≛≐⎰⎴
㱽Īġ [Labor Contract Law (P.R.C.)] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l. 
People’s Cong., June 29, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 2008) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S 
CONG. GAZ. (P.R.C.) [hereinafter LCL]. The law is also translated alternatively as the 
“Employment Contract Law” or “ECL”. 
2.  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Hetong Fa (2012 Xiuzheng) (୰⋶Ṣ
㮹ℙ␴⚥≛≐⎰⎴㱽(2012ಟṇ)) [Labor Contract Law (P.R.C.) (2012 amendment)], 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l. People’s Cong., Dec. 28, 2013, effective 
July 1, 2012) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. (P.R.C.) [hereinafter LCL 
Amendments]. 
3. See infra Part III. (discussing these provisions). As discussed below, the term 
“dispatched workers” (laowu paiqian yuangong ≛≉㳦怋ઈᐕ) under the LCL actually 
includes three separate categories of positions: “temporary,” “auxiliary,” and 
“substitute.” LCL, supra note 1, art. 66. The Chinese term, laowu paiqian (≛࣑㳦怋) is 
frequently translated as “labor dispatch” and the sourcing agencies are often referred 
to as the dispatching employer, “intermediary employment agencies”, or simply as 
“temp agencies”. 
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Law took effect in 1995,4 including “equal pay for equal work,” 
employment on the basis of employment contracts, minimum 
labor standards for all workers, and basic rules on length of 
service, termination, and severance.5 The LCL amendments are, 
therefore, the latest attempt to close implementation gaps that 
have been a hallmark of labor law reform since its inception. 
The persistence of implementation gaps—the divide 
between the law on the books and the law in practice—in the 
face of continued legislative and regulatory reforms is a 
consistent focal point of regulatory scholars in law, sociology, 
and public administration, 6  as well as observers of China’s 
reform path. 7  The 2013 amendments offer a renewed 
opportunity to examine this fundamental question as it plays out 
in labor and employment law. In short, why have two major 
legislative reforms, the 1995 Labor Law and the 2008 reforms 
that introduced the LCL and related legislation, as well as 
numerous implementing measures adopted by courts, 
legislatures, and regulators at the national and subnational 
levels, failed to change basic labor practices?  Given this history, 
is this most recent effort likely to succeed? 

4. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Fa (୰⋶Ṣ㮹ℙ␴⚥≛≐㱽) [Labor 
Law (P.R.C.)], (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l. People’s Cong. (P.R.C.), 
July 5, 1994, effective Jan. 1, 1995) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 
(P.R.C.) [hereinafter Labor Law]. 
5. See, e.g., Labor Law, art. 46 (requiring equal pay for equal work); id. ch. 3 
(regarding labor contracts); id. chs. 5–6 (regarding working conditions and 
occupational safety and health); id. arts. 20–32 (regarding contract term, termination, 
and dissolution). For a more complete comparison of the Labor Law and the LCL, see 
infra Part II.B. 
6. See generally, e.g., FIONA HAINES, CORPORATE REGULATION: BEYOND “PUNISH OR 
PERSUADE” (1997); IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: 
TRANSCENDING THE DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); Lesley K. McAllister et al., 
Reorienting Regulation: Pollution Enforcement in Industrializing Countries, 32 LAW & POL’Y 1 
(2010) (assessing approaches to environmental law enforcement). 
7. See generally, e.g., IMPLEMENTATION OF LAW IN THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
(Jianfu Chen et al. eds., 2000); Sean Cooney, Making Chinese Labor Law Work: The 
Prospects for Regulatory Innovation in the People’s Republic of China, 30 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 
1050 (2006) (surveying challenges to labor law enforcement); Benjamin van Rooij & 
Carlos Wing-Hung Lo, Fragile Convergence: Understanding Variation in the Enforcement of 
China’s Industrial Pollution Law, 32 L. & POL’Y 14 (2010) (identifying similar challenges 
to environmental law enforcement). 
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Theories of legal recursivity, developed initially by Terence 
Halliday and Bruce Carruthers,8 offer a useful framework for 
understanding the dynamic interplay between law and its 
implementation. They observe that legal change proceeds 
through iterative cycles of lawmaking and implementation that 
are kept in tension by four drivers or mechanisms: the 
indeterminacy of law, the ideological and structural 
contradictions internalized in law, “diagnostic” struggles among 
competing actors involved in the legislative process, and 
mismatches between the actors involved in lawmaking and those 
tasked with implementation.9 At their most basic, these recursive 
cycles move from statutes or court decisions to practice to new 
statutes or further decisions, or from regulation to compliance 
experience to further regulations. 10  In addition to factors 
endogenous to the recursive cycle itself, exogenous factors, such 
as triggering events or global pressures, also shape the process of 
legal change.11 
As detailed in Part II below, the new amendments represent 
the latest stage of a recursive reform process. They also respond 
to a phenomenon widely observed by academics and 
policymakers over the past several decades—a near-universal 
increase in the nonstandard workforce worldwide.12 Despite the 

8 . These theories were developed initially in studies of global commercial 
lawmaking and draw heavily on neo-institutional perspectives of legislative reform. See 
BRUCE G. CARRUTHERS & TERENCE C. HALLIDAY, RESCUING BUSINESS: THE MAKING OF 
CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY LAW IN ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES 45–62 (1998); 
Terence C. Halliday & Bruce G. Carruthers, The Recursivity of Law: Global Norm Making 
and National Lawmaking in the Globalization of Corporate Insolvency Regimes, 112 AM. J. SOC. 
1125 (2007). 
9. Id. at 1149–53. See Sida Liu & Terence C. Halliday, Recursivity in Legal Change: 
Lawyers and Reforms of China’s Criminal Procedure Law, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY. 911, 913–
14 (2009) (elaborating on the theory). 
10. Halliday & Carruthers, supra note 8, at 1144. 
11. Id. at 1145–46. 
12 . For a comprehensive review of these trends, see Arne L. Kalleberg, 
Nonstandard Employment Relations: Part-time, Temporary and Contract Work, 26 ANN. REV. 
SOC. 341, 341 (2000) (defining “nonstandard work arrangements” as “part-time work, 
temporary employment, and contract work”). On US trends, see, for example, 
AMERICAN STAFFING ASSOC., AMERICAN STAFFING 2012: STRUCTURAL SHIFT?, STAFFING 
SUCCESS 10 (2012), available at http://www.americanstaffing.net/statistics/pdf/
AmericanStaffingAnnualAnalysis_2012.pdf (observing a 45% increase in temp agency 
employment since 2009, following a 38% decline during the financial crisis); Katherine 
V.W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: Employment Law for Workers without 
Workplaces and Employees without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 251 (2006) 
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many labels used to describe them,13 all of these arrangements 
lack one or more of the hallmarks of standard employment: full-
time work for an indefinite period that is performed at the 
employer’s place of business under the employer’s direction.14 
Hiring through temp agencies and other intermediaries has 
contributed significantly to these trends, as employers look to 
reduce their regulatory burden, outsource responsibility for 
human resources functions, lower labor and benefit costs, and 
gain the flexibility they need to quickly respond to shifts in 
market demand.15 In many jurisdictions, the growth of the labor 
services industry has been spurred by deregulatory policies 
intended to facilitate its use as a catalyst for job creation and 
increased productivity.16 
Strictly speaking, of course, workers sourced through temp 
agencies need not in fact be temporary. Such workers are 
employed under an employment contract with a labor services 
agency, typically for a fixed term, and then assigned to perform 

[hereinafter Stone, Atypical Employees]; Katherine V.W. Stone, Flexibilization, 
Globalization, and Privatization: Three Challenges to Labour Rights in Our Time, 44 
OSGOODE HALL L. J. 77 (2006); Clyde W. Summers, Contingent Employment in the United 
States, 18 COMP. LAB. L. J. 503 (1997); Richard S. Belous, The Rise of the Contingent Work 
Force: The Key Challenges & Opportunities, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 863, 867 (1995). In 
2005, the Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal devoted a symposium issue to the 
topic. See Symposium, Bridging The Past and the Future: A Symposium on Comparative Labor 
Law, 27 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 1 (2005). 
13. Common terms include “nonstandard employment relations,” “alternative 
work arrangements,” “market-mediated arrangements,” “nontraditional employment 
relations,” “flexible staffing arrangements,” “flexible working practices,” “atypical 
employment,” “vagrant or peripheral employment,” “vulnerable work,” “precarious 
employment,” and “disposable” or “contingent” work. See Kalleberg, supra note 12, at 
341 (reviewing the literature). 
14. Id. 
15. See, e.g., RICHARD CARLSON & SCOTT A. MOSS, EMPLOYMENT LAW 8 (3d ed. 
2013) (discussing some of the common drivers of growing demand for dispatched 
workers and increases in other outsourcing practices). 
16. See, e.g., Bernd Waas, A Quid Pro Quo in Temporary Agency Work: Abolishing 
Restrictions and Establishing Equal Treatment—Lessons to Be Learned from European and 
German Labor Law?, 34 COMP. L. & POL’Y J. 47–51 (2012) (discussing the deregulation 
of temporary agency work across Europe and under the 2008 European Union 
Directive on Temporary Agency Work); Gyeongjoon Yoo & Changhui Kang, The Effect 
of Protection of Temporary Workers on Employment Levels: Evidence from the 2007 Reform of 
South Korea, 65 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 578, 580–83 (2012) (discussing the rationale 
for expansion of temporary hiring and similar trends in South Korea); Masanori 
Kuroki, The Deregulation of Temporary Employment & Workers’ Perceptions of Job Insecurity, 
65 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 560 (2012) (analyzing the impact of deregulation in Japan). 
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services, which may be on a short-term or longer basis, for 
another firm (i.e. the “using” or “receiving” firm) under the 
terms of a labor services contract between that firm and the 
temp agency.17 At the same time, the term “temporary workers” 
includes those hired directly by an employer on a contingent or 
part-time basis. Accordingly, although the term “temp workers” 
is a convenient shorthand for all workers sourced from a temp 
agency, this Article uses the more literal terms “labor dispatch” 
and “dispatched workers” to avoid the impression that all such 
workers are in temporary positions.18 
For employees, temp agency hiring can offer flexible work 
arrangements and the prospect of transitioning to long-term 
employment, as well as the opportunity to gain experience and 
skills.19 However, hiring through intermediaries generally offers 
employees lower wages and benefits, lower wage stability, and 
greater risk of workforce reductions in an economic downturn.20 
Prior empirical work also confirms that labor dispatch creates 
structural disincentives to training investments,21 and that high 
rates of short-term employment, including some forms of labor 
dispatch, can worsen high turnover rates, increase employee 
vulnerability, and further weaken the mutual commitment of 
employers and their workers.22 Other studies have demonstrated 
a correlation between the use of labor dispatch and other 
nonstandard work with heightened workplace accident rates.23 
The social effects of an over-reliance on labor dispatch and 

17. For a detailed description of these arrangements, see infra Part II.C. 
18. See supra note 3 (regarding variations). 
19. See, e.g., Stephen F. Befort, Revisiting the Black Hole of Workplace Regulation: A 
Historical and Comparative Perspective on Contingent Work, 24 BERKELEY. J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
153, 161 (2003) (discussing incentives for contingent work arrangements). 
20. TIMOTHY P. GLYNN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: PRIVATE ORDERING AND ITS 
LIMITATIONS 28 (2d ed. 2011). See Luo et al., The Expanding Role of Temporary Help 
Services from 1990 to 2008, MONTHLY LAB. REV., Aug. 2010, at 4, 12 (measuring volatility 
of losses and gains in the labor services sector during the recession and following); 
MARION G. CRAIN ET AL., WORK LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 67 (2d ed. 2010) 
(discussing disparities and uncertain application of employment laws). 
21. Timothy J. Bartkiw, Baby Steps? Toward the Regulation of Temporary Help Agency 
Employment in Canada, 31 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 163, 175 (2009) (surveying the 
literature). 
22. See Arturo Bronstein, Trends and Challenges of Labour Law in Central Europe, in 
GLOBALIZATION & THE FUTURE OF LABOUR LAW 191, 207 (John D.R. Craig & S. Michael 
Lynk eds., 2006) (discussing the negative impacts of temporary work). 
23. Id. 
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other nonstandard forms of employment on gender imbalances, 
employee productivity, and morale are equally troubling. 24 
These factors are not conducive to innovation or the 
development of the highly trained yet nimble workforce that 
China and other nations hope to produce. 
The growth of the labor services industry and the expansion 
of the nonstandard workforce more broadly therefore raise 
difficult legal questions about: (i) the permissibility of disparities 
in the terms and conditions of employment for standard and 
nonstandard workers; (ii) the allocation of responsibility for 
compliance with labor and employment laws between the 
sourcing and the requesting firm; and (iii) more fundamentally, 
how “employer” and “employee” should be defined and 
interpreted under regulatory regimes designed with standard 
employment relationships in mind. 25  In China, as in other 
jurisdictions, the resolution of these questions is critical to the 
effective implementation of protective legislation that benefits 
all workers, not only just dispatched workers. 
China’s reforms must be understood in a broader global 
context.  In the United States, legislatures and courts have 
largely sought to adapt existing labor and employment law and 
regulations to address nonstandard employment, with mixed 
success. 26  More expansive reforms are being introduced in 
emerging markets. In the past five years, Mexico, South Korea, 
and governments in Europe have adopted new legislation that 

24. The disproportionate impact of informalization on gender disparities in the 
workplace is well-documented. See, e.g., Jonathan P. Hiatt, Policy Issues Concerning the 
Contingent Workforce, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 739, 744 (1995). Empirical evidence also 
substantiates the profound negative attitudinal and social impacts created by 
heterogeneity in employment arrangements among employees of a common employer. 
See Joseph P. Broschak & Alison Davis-Blake, Mixing Standard Work & Nonstandard 
Deals: The Consequences of Heterogeneity in Employment Arrangements, 40 ACAD. MGMT. J. 
371, 372 (2006) (investigating the impact of disparities between standard and 
temporary work arrangements among workers at two US locations of a multinational 
financial services firm). 
25. See Befort, supra note 19, at 153, 158–60, 164–71 (discussing these challenges 
within the US regulatory framework). On the limits of status-based employment 
legislation, see generally Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee 
When it Sees One and How it Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295 
(2001). 
26. See generally Stone, Atypical Employees, supra note 12 (surveying the application 
of U.S. employment laws to temp agency hired and other nonstandard workers); 
Befort, supra note 19, at 164–70 (same). 
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explicitly addresses legal protections for workers hired through 
temporary agencies. 27 These reforms follow similar changes in 
the early 2000s introduced in many Latin American countries 
that by some estimates represent a “reversal of the trend towards 
informality,” with new measures that limit temporary contracts, 
regulate subcontracting, and restore or create minimum wage 
standards.28 
China’s first major step in the same direction began with 
the enactment in 2008 of the LCL itself, which contained new 
provisions on labor dispatch and other forms of nonstandard 
work. 29  Recent empirical studies offer evidence of the 
effectiveness of the LCL in promoting longer-term employment 
relationships, improved compliance with labor contracting 
mandates, and broader public awareness of legal protections for 
workers.30 However, other evidence indicates that while these 
impressive gains may have improved legal protections for 
standard workers, the LCL’s passage has in fact deepened the 
informalization of the Chinese workforce. 31  This evidence 

27. On recent reforms in Mexico and South Korea, see infra Part V. On European 
reforms, see generally Waas, supra note 16. See also Bronstein, supra note 22, at 207–10 
(discussing efforts to address the problems caused by temp agency hiring and the 
challenges of outsourcing to independent contractors who are in fact dependent on 
the hiring firm). 
28 . Simon Deakin, The Contribution of Labour Law to Economic & Human 
Development, in THE IDEA OF LABOUR LAW 156, 167–70 (Guy Davidov & Brian Langille, 
eds. 2011). 
29. LCL, supra note 1. 
30 . See generally Mary Gallagher et al., China’s 2008 Labor Contract Law: 
Implementation and Implications for China’s Workers (Inst. for the Study of Labor  
Discussion Paper No. 7555 2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2318736 
(presenting the results of a longitudinal study based on urban household survey data 
and a national survey of 1600 manufacturing firms conducted by the People’s Bank of 
China); see also Cheng Yanyuan & Yang Liu, “Laodong Hetongfa” Shishi Dui Woguo Qiye 
Renli Ziyuan Guanli de Yingxiang: Jiyu Renli Ziyuan Jingli de Guandian [The Impact of the 
Labor Contract Law’s Enforcement on Chinese Enterprises’ Human Resources Management – 
Based on the Perspective of HR Managers], 7 JINGJI LILUN YU JINGJI GUANLI [ECON. 
THEORY & BUS. MGMT.] 66 (2010) (finding that the LCL has led to an increase in the 
use and term of written contracts and the number of indefinite-term contracts, as well 
as to greater care in recruiting and hiring decisions); Fan Cui et al., The Effects of the 
Labor Contract Law on the Chinese Labor Market, 10 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 462 (2013) 
(concluding that the LCL resulted in higher wage and benefit growth and greater labor 
market rigidity). 
31. See infra Part II. These trends are explored further in Albert Park & Fang Cai, 
The Informalization of the Chinese Labor Market, in FROM IRON RICE BOWL TO 
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indicates that many employers in China have substituted 
dispatched workers for standard hires on a wholesale basis 
precisely to avoid the perceived risks and costs of compliance 
with employment laws and regulations.32 The extent of this 
substitution effect has not been fully accounted for in prior 
studies on the LCL’s impact precisely because of the many 
barriers to identifying the scale and scope of the nonstandard 
workforce.33 By allowing labor dispatch to be used as a means of 
creative compliance and continued evasion, the LCL has in fact 
limited the degree to which the standards originally set by the 
Labor Law and the LCL are realized across the Chinese 
economy. 
This Article draws on theories of legal recursivity to analyze 
the LCL amendments and new implementing rules that took 
effect in March 2014, which represent the latest stage of China’s 
decades-long project of labor law reform.34 Part I begins with an 
introduction to the recursivity framework and the protections 
already available to dispatched employees under the LCL. 
Integrating findings from the literature on regulatory 
compliance, it observes that the incentive structures embedded 
in the LCL and what we refer to as the “regulatory distance”—

INFORMALIZATION: MARKETS, WORKERS, AND THE STATE IN A CHANGING CHINA 17 (Mary 
E. Gallagher et al., eds., 2011). 
32. For empirical evidence of the substitution effect of temp hires, see infra Part 
II.C. Similar motivations also affect employers in the United States. See Befort, supra 
note 19, at 158–60, 164–71 (calling contingent work a regulatory “black hole” because 
such workers fall outside the safety net that the regulations provide for employment 
relationships). 
33. The most comprehensive study of the LCL’s implementation of which we are 
aware is the study by Gallagher, et al., supra note 30. Its authors acknowledge the 
limitations of their survey instrument in distinguishing standard and dispatched 
employees. Id. at 16 n.9. They also recognize that the employment effects of tougher 
LCL implementation may have been muted since firms are evading the LCL’s 
requirements by expanding hiring through labor dispatch. Id. at 30. The lack of any 
formal registration requirement for temp agencies in China prior to the recent 
amendments has also impeded accurate evaluation of the true scale of labor dispatch in 
China since 2008. See infra note 37 and accompanying text (acknowledging the lack of 
precise figures). 
34. A draft of the implementing rules was released for public comment on August 
7, 2013, with the final version issued in early 2014. PRC Ministry of Human Resources 
and Social Security (“MOHRSS”), Laowu Paiqian Zanxing Guiding (≛≉㳦怋㘪埴奬
⭂ġ) [Interim Provisions on Labor Dispatch] (promulgated by the Ministry of Human 
Resources and Social Security (P.R.C.), Jan. 24, 2014, effective Mar. 1, 2014) 
[hereinafter Labor Dispatch Provisions], available at www.mohrss.gov.cn . 
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that is, how far the demands of the new legislation diverge from 
current norms in the target population—have deepened the 
informalization of the workforce in China, despite the contrary 
goals of the LCL. We argue that these new dimensions of 
recursive legal reform might enrich the existing theoretical 
framework. Part III proposes further implementing measures 
that, if adopted at the national or local level, might better 
advance the amendments’ stated goals and “wind down” the 
recursive cycle. The Article adopts a comparative perspective 
throughout, particularly with reference to relevant aspects of US 
law, and concludes by placing China’s ongoing labor reform 
experiment in the context of recent efforts by governments in 
both emerging and developed economies to address the 
regulatory challenges created by the informalization of labor. 
I. RECURSIVE LEGAL REFORM & THE INFORMALIZATION OF 
LABOR 
The informalization of the Chinese workforce in its many 
forms can be traced back to the early years of the reform 
period.35  Hiring through temp agencies, a key part of this 
informalization, has itself been an established employment 
model since the 1970s, when foreign representative offices were 
first required to hire exclusively through third-party agencies.36 
However, as we explain below, labor dispatch has expanded 
dramatically since the passage of the LCL. 
According to the most recent estimates by the All-China 
Federation of Trade Unions (“ACFTU”), more than 60 million, 
or one-fifth, of China’s 300 million urban employees are now 

35. See Park & Cai, supra note 31, at 17, 20 (defining “informal” employment as 
work that is “often temporary, lacks a formal contract, and does not provide social 
insurance benefits or other worker protections”). 
36. This requirement was formalized in the Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo 
Guowuyuan Guanyu Guanli Waiguo Qiye Changzhu Daibiao Jigou de Zanxing Guiding 
(୰⋶Ṣ㮹ℙ␴⚥⚥≉昊ℛḶ䭉䎮⢾⚥ẩ᷂ⷠ樣ẋ堐㛢㜬䘬㘪埴奬ᐃ[Interim 
Regulations of the People’s Republic of China Concerning the Control of Resident 
Representative Offices of Foreign Enterprises] (promulgated by the State Council, Oct. 
30, 1980, effective Oct. 30, 1980) (P.R.C.), and by Guanyu Waiguo Qiye Changzhu 
Daibiao Jigou Dengji Guanli Banfa (යனእᅜ௻᷂ⷠ樣ẋ堐㛢㜬ⲫ䇠䭉䎮≆㱽) 
[Administrative Measures for the Registration of Resident Representative Offices of 
Foreign Enterprises] (promulgated by the State Administration for Industry & 
Commerce, Mar. 15, 1983, effective Mar. 15, 1983) art. 11 (P.R.C.).  
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dispatched workers. 37  By comparison, the percentage of all 
nonstandard workers in the United States, of which labor 
services hires are a subset, is currently around twenty percent of 
the workforce. 38  Although temp agency hiring has nearly 
doubled since the 1990s, it still accounts for less than two 
percent of total employment in the United States.39 
Before the recent reforms took effect in 2013, dispatched 
workers accounted for anywhere from one-third to as high as 
seventy percent of the workforce for many firms, including state-
owned enterprises (“SOE”) and foreign-invested firms alike.40 

37. Accurate estimates are hard to come by. These figures come from a widely 
cited report of the Economic Observer quoting the results of a 2011 study of labor 
dispatch by China’s national labor union, the All-China Federation of Trade Unions 
(“ACFTU”). See Jiang Wenzhang, Quanwei Baogao Cheng “Laowu Paiqian” Da 6000wan
Ren QuanZong Jianyi Xiugai Laodong Hetongfa (ᵳေᣕ੺〠Ā䗮 6000 зӪޘᙫᔪ䇞؞᭩
ǉࣣࣘਸ਼⌅Ǌ) [Authoritative Report Says “Labor Dispatch” Workers Reach 60 Million, 
ACFTU Recommends Amending the Labor Contract Law]㸪JINGJI GUANCHA (㓿⍾㿲ሏ㖁) 
[ECONOMIC OBSERVER] (Feb. 25, 2011). The ACFTU report analyzed data obtained in 
2010. More conservative estimates by the MOHRSS for 2009 reported only 27 million 
dispatched workers.  
38. The Bureau of Labor Statistics reported that as of September, 2013, the total 
part-time workers and those employed in temporary help services accounted for 
approximately 20% of the employed workforce. Bureau of Labor Statistics, The 
Employment Situation (Sept. 2013), www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/empsit 
_10222013.pdf [hereinafter 2013 BLS Employment Report]; Befort, supra note 19, at 
159 (citing sources from the 1990s putting the figure near thirty percent). 
39. As of September, 2013, employment in “temporary help services” accounted 
for a seasonally-adjusted 1.2% of the employed labor force. 2013 BLS Employment 
Report, supra note 38. This figure is similar to 2008 levels, which take into account 
disproportionate job losses among temp agency hires in 2007 and 2008. Luo et al., 
supra note 20, at 4, 12. The number of workers sourced via staffing agencies has 
continued to grow in recent years, accounting for upwards of fifty percent of newly 
created positions. Ben Baden, Larger Temporary Workforce Could be the New Normal, U.S. 
NEWS & WORLD REP. (Nov. 7, 2011), http://money.usnews.com/money/careers/
articles/2011/11/17/larger-temporary-workforce-could-be-new-normal (citing the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics on the size of the temporary workforce from 2009 to 2011). 
These figures represent the number of contingent, contractual, seasonal, freelance, 
just-in-time or “temp” workers who are hired under contract with a staffing agency that 
supplies them to a requesting firm. Luo et al., supra note 20, at 1 (following the 
definition of the “temporary help services industry” used by the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics). 
40. See In China, a Growing Demand for Temps, BUS. WK., Mar. 12, 2012, at 16 
(citing sources estimating that 70% of the workforce of some state sector employers, 
including Sinopec and China Telecom, are temp workers) [hereinafter Growing 
Demand]; China Tightens Loophole on Hiring Temporary Workers, REUTERS (Dec. 28, 2012), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/28/us-china-labor-
idUSBRE8BR04120121228. (citing estimates placing temp hiring levels in foreign-
invested firms at one-third to half); see also Jiang Yunzhang, Labor Contract Law to Be 
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Indeed, SOEs and other public employers, such as state 
agencies, universities, public hospitals, and financial institutions, 
have relied the most heavily on labor dispatch.41 Clearly, the 
phenomenon is not limited to low-skilled manufacturing labor. 
In fact, according to the ACFTU report, dispatched workers 
have been more heavily employed in service industries such as 
medicine, banking, finance, and telecommunications. 42 
Underemployed college graduates accounted for nearly half of 
all dispatched workers surveyed in one study by the Guangdong 
Provincial Federation of Trade Unions in 2012.43 
Macroeconomic shifts offer a partial explanation for these 
numbers. Labor costs in China have risen exponentially over the 
past decade, driven in part by labor shortages in traditional 
urban manufacturing centers, tougher grassroots demands from 
a new generation of migrant workers, and changing 
development policies that require increased domestic 
purchasing power to offset weakness in foreign export markets.44 
As in the West, labor dispatch has enabled many employers to 
reduce the cost of social insurance and other benefits. 45 
Increased demand for flexible, cost-effective hiring models has 
also contributed to informalization, as employers attempt to 
keep up with seasonal consumer demand and just-in-time 
inventory practices. But understanding the rapid growth of labor 
dispatch and its connection to the compliance gaps that 
continue to drive scandals and protest requires a closer look at 
the path of Chinese labor law reform itself. 

Revised, ECON. OBSERVER (Mar. 27, 2012) (reporting that sixty percent of companies in 
the finance industry use seconded workers). 
41. See Jiang, Authoritative Report, supra note 37 (reporting on industry trends 
contained in the ACFTU survey). 
42. Id. 
43. INTERNATIONAL LABOR UNION CONFEDERATION HONG KONG LIAISON OFFICE, 
ACFTU MADE SECOND APPEAL TO THE NPC TO REGULATE AGENCY WORK (2012), 
available at http://www.ihlo.org/LRC/ACFTU/010312.html [hereinafter IHLO 
Report]. 
44. See, e.g., Gordon Feng & Kay Cai, Delays Ahead: Why New Labour Rules Raise 
Stress Levels, 26 CHINA L. & PRAC. 7 (June 2012) (“Many provinces and cities announced 
[a] double salary plan in 2010 targeted at doubling employees’ average income within 
five years, or a 15% increase each year” in order to spur consumption-driven growth). 
45. See, e.g., CARLSON & MOSS, supra note 15, at 8 (observing that contingent 
workers in the United States commonly receive reduced benefits). On the Chinese 
context, see infra notes 126–31and accompanying text. 
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A. Recursivity & Legal Reform 
The LCL amendments are only the latest in a series of 
legislative reforms over the past decade, some quite innovative, 
that have, on balance, strengthened legal protections and 
remedies available to Chinese workers. 46  Nonetheless, as 
discussed below, these most recent reforms, and in fact the LCL 
itself, in many respects only reemphasize and reinforce 
requirements found in pre-existing labor and employment law: 
“equal pay for equal work,” hiring by written contract, basic 
labor standards, and rules on dismissals and severance.47 
Halliday and Carruthers’ theory of recursivity offers a way to 
understand why reforms may fail to “take” initially and also 
helps identify factors that might raise the chance of success for 
later reforms. Their theory sees the relationship between formal 
law—the law on the books—and implementation—law in 
action—not as a simple linear or causal relationship, but as a 
dynamic, recursive social process.48 Accordingly, law in practice 
is both an outcome of the legislative process and a catalyst for 
future lawmaking.49 
Recursive cycles of legal change can be explained, they 
posit, by four primary drivers or mechanisms that produce gaps 
between formal law and its implementation that then necessitate 
and shape the direction of further reforms. Indeterminacy refers 
to the inherent ambiguity, vagueness, and gaps in legislation, as 
well as conflicts with other regulations, statutes, or cases.50 
Contradictions refers to underlying economic, political, or 
ideological divides (collectively, “ideological contradictions”) 
and “structural contradictions” among competing lawmaking or 
implementation organizations within the state.51 Recursivity is 
also caused by diagnostic struggles in the process of lawmaking or 
implementation among contesting parties who disagree about 

46. See infra Part II (surveying some of these changes). A full treatment of these 
reforms is beyond the scope of this article. Many are detailed in RONALD C. BROWN, 
UNDERSTANDING LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW IN CHINA (2008). 
47. See supra note 5. 
48. Halliday & Carruthers, supra note 8, at 1142; Liu & Halliday, supra note 9, at 
912. 
49. See Halliday & Carruthers, supra note 27, at 1146. 
50. See Liu & Halliday, supra note 9, at 914; Halliday & Carruthers, supra note 8, at 
1149. 
51. See Halliday & Carruthers, supra note 8, at 1149. 
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the appropriate identification of the problem at hand and 
therefore, about its solution. 52  Finally, legal change can be 
stymied by actor mismatch, which occurs when there is a wide 
disparity between the actors involved in lawmaking and those 
involved in its implementation, resulting in resistance or 
distortion in the implementation phase by those excluded from 
the law-making process.53 Of course, law-making is generally 
undertaken by legislatures, courts, and administrative agencies, 
while implementation involves a broader range of actors and 
includes statutory interpretation, the daily work of legal 
professionals, the function of enforcement agencies and other 
authorities, and the response of individuals and entities to 
whom the law is applied.54 
Halliday and Carruthers also observe that exogenous 
factors, such as pressure from international actors and trading 
partners or triggering events, such as a scandal or crisis, can start 
the reform cycle and affect its progress.55 Exogenous factors are 
particularly salient in labor and employment law reform, since 
labor and employment is inextricably linked to the health of 
local and global markets, demographic and social changes, and 
political shifts. Indeed, observers note that the history of labor 
law reform in the West, and more recently, in Latin America, 
Eastern Europe, and Asia, is evidence that “the principal 
institutions of labour law–the individual employment 
relationship, collective bargaining and social insurance–have 
evolved in parallel with the emergence of labour markets in 
market economies.”56 Recursive cycles of national law reform 

52. Id. at 1150–51. 
53. Id. at 1152–53. 
54. Liu & Halliday, supra note 9, at 914. 
55. Halliday & Carruthers, supra note 8, at 1146–47 (discussing these factors as 
both contextual and stimulative). This comports with the observations of scholars in 
political science and public administration on the drivers of policy cycles. See, e.g., 
James L. True et al., Punctuated Equilibrium Theory: Explaining Stability and Change in 
Public Policymaking, in THEORIES OF THE POLICY PROCESS 155, 160 (Paul A. Sabatier ed., 
2d ed. 2007) (explaining major policy shifts or policy “punctuations” as the product of 
both endogenous and exogenous triggers). 
56. See Deakin, supra note 28, at 162, 167–71 (tracing reforms in Latin America 
and Eastern Europe) (citation omitted); see also Bob Hepple, Factors Influencing the 
Making and Transformation of Labour Law in Europe, in THE IDEA OF LABOUR LAW, supra 
note 28, at 37–40 (examining the influence of labor movements and civil society in 
shaping labor law in Europe). 
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may also be strongly influenced by global efforts at norm 
construction that can affect the momentum, content, and 
trajectory of domestic legal reform.57 
Comparative labor and employment law offers numerous 
examples of the dynamics Halliday and Carruthers observe. 
Indeed, their work was inspired by studies of a series of 19th 
century reforms known as the English Factory Acts that were 
enacted and replaced in turn as the initial attempts to address 
the sweatshop factory conditions of the Industrial Revolution 
were defeated by limited regulatory capacity or active 
resistance. 58  Employment discrimination law in the United 
States, which began with early executive orders, carried through 
until the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and ultimately, led to the 
implementation of Title VII, offers another example of recursive 
reform.59  Although neither we nor Halliday and Carruthers 
espouse any notion of evolutionary development paths as an 
outcome of recursive reform, there are many resemblances 
between the cycles of reform experienced in the West and the 
ongoing reform of Chinese labor and employment law.   
The recursive reform model emphasizes that the legislative 
goals reflected in the early stages of a reform cycle may be 
redefined as the law is implemented, and that recursive cycles 
are in fact a process of norm formation rather than a linear path 
toward a fixed goal; reinterpretations or reformulations of 
existing norms, not all of which are necessarily explicit in law, 
may emerge in practice and may ultimately be incorporated 
formally by legislation later in the cycle (or not).60 Thus, it may 
be difficult to observe without the benefit of hindsight what the 
outcome or end point of a given cycle might be. This is 
particularly true in the Chinese case where the reform process 
spans decades and is shaped by changes in national and 
subnational leadership and policy priorities. 

57. See Halliday & Carruthers, supra note 8, at 1173. 
58. Id. at 1144. 
59. Id. 
60. As originally conceived, Halliday and Carruthers explored the intersections of 
global norm-making at the international level among states and institutions and state-
level legislation. See id. at 1137–38, 1141–43 (surveying the literature on the 
intersections of legal change and normative or social change). 
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The remainder of this Part analyzes the LCL, its 
implementation, its amendment in 2012, and the amendments’ 
recent implementing rules, as iterations in a recursive reform 
cycle. While recognizing the complex political and institutional 
forces behind the reform process, we nonetheless believe that 
each stage of formal legal reform in China can be viewed, at 
least since the passage of the Labor Law in 1994, as directed at 
conforming employment practice and accepted norms to the 
broad goals outlined at the start of this Section, which have 
remained largely constant over the past two decades. Applying a 
recursivity framework offers insights into why recent reforms 
appear to be largely covering old ground and suggests whether 
the most recent reforms are likely to affect employment 
practice. 
As explored below, China’s labor reform project can be 
partially explained in terms of the four mechanisms identified 
by Halliday and Carruthers. Although less explicit in the 
following discussion, exogenous factors also play a role. For 
example, global actors such as multinational corporations, 
transnational NGO networks, and international organizations, 
such as the International Labour Organization (“ILO”), 
exercise continued influence and have the opportunity to 
inform both the law-making and implementation sides of the 
equation. The global financial crisis has certainly impacted 
recent policy debates on labor reform in China,61 and each cycle 
of labor law reform has also been spurred by local scandals that 
directly shaped policy debates.62 
However, two critical drivers not captured in Halliday and 
Carruthers’ model also appear to have perpetuated the recursive 
cycle. As explained in Part III, incorporating these factors into 
the recursivity model adds, we believe, both explanatory and 
predictive power to the framework. First, the LCL’s tougher 
worker protections altered employer incentives by 

61. The financial crisis sparked renewed attention within China and abroad to the 
need for a policy shift away from export-dependent growth and toward stronger 
domestic consumption. The latter approach requires sustained local incomes, which 
strengthens advocates of higher wages and benefits. 
62. ’The passage of the LCL was spurred, in part, by a scandal over illegal forced 
labor at brick kilns in Shanxi Province. See Virginia E. Harper Ho, From Contracts to 
Compliance? An Early Look at Implementation under China’s New Labor Legislation, 23 
COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 35, 73 n.167 (2009). 
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simultaneously raising labor costs, increasing penalties for 
noncompliance, while it also expanded labor dispatch and other 
alternative hiring practices as a less costly means of formal 
compliance. Second, the “regulatory distance” between the 
standards set by the LCL and dominant compliance norms in 
the economy was wide, which produced a longer and more 
uncertain implementation phase. 
We use the term “regulatory distance” to refer to a measure 
of the magnitude of change that must occur for compliance 
norms, as reflected by common understandings and practices in 
the relevant industry and jurisdiction, to conform to the letter 
and spirit of the new legal rule. It is therefore distinct from the 
concept of compliance gaps, which focuses on how far an 
individual firm’s conduct diverges from legal requirements. In 
this Article, we identify regulatory distance at a more general 
level. 63  Nonetheless, we suggest that it might readily be 
measured by using a combination of (i) objective factors, such as 
estimated compliance costs, the estimated length of time market 
actors anticipate will be required for average firms to achieve 
full compliance, and the frequency and severity of violations of 
pre-existing legal rules in the pre- and post-reform periods; and 
(ii) subjective factors, such as the level of opposition voiced by 
firms during the drafting process and the post-reform reaction 
voiced by compliance-minded firms. Future studies might 
examine how these and other factors might best operationalize 
regulatory distance as a construct. The following Part applies 
recursivity theory to examine how Chinese labor law itself has 
contributed to the informalization of labor and to consider the 
potential effect of the 2013 LCL amendments. 
B. The Labor Contract Law: Too Much Too Soon? 
The current regulatory framework of Chinese labor law was 
formally instituted at the national level in 1994 with the passage 
of the Labor Law. 64 However, in reality, the Labor Law replaced 
a vast body of administrative regulations adopted much earlier 
in the reform period, which are perhaps rightly viewed as the 

63. We assume that regulatory distance will always exist if the reform is intended 
to change behavior. 
64. Labor Law, supra note 4. 
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initial stage of labor law reform. 65 In 2008, the LCL and two 
related laws adopted in 2007 together marked a watershed as the 
first national effort to revamp labor and employment legislation 
since 1994. 66  Although each measure has been shaped by 
differing policy goals and new provisions have been introduced 
to respond to changing circumstances, it is striking how much of 
the content of the LCL and its amendments, discussed below, 
either repeat verbatim or are directed at shoring up 
requirements long established in the 1995 Labor Law, such as 
the written contract requirement, employer obligations to pay 
social insurance benefits, 67  limits on excessive overtime, 
prohibitions on abusive employment practices, and an “equal 
pay for equal work” mandate.68 
Many of the factors identified by Halliday and Carruthers 
offer a partial explanation for this recursive cycle. First, the 
Labor Law, like many national-level basic laws (jiben fa ᇶᮏἲ), 
was drafted in fairly broad terms and then fleshed out by later 

65. Id. On this history, see generally HILARY K. JOSEPHS, LABOUR LAW IN CHINA: 
CHOICE AND RESPONSIILITY (1990) (tracing the history of the reforms from the 1950s 
through the 1980s). Some of these rules were incorporated into the Labor Law and, as 
in other areas of Chinese legal reform, its drafters had the benefit of lessons obtained 
during the earlier, experimental phase before fundamental national-level legislation 
was adopted. 
66. LCL, supra note 1. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Zhengyi Tiaojie 
Zhongcai Fa (୰⋶Ṣ㮹ℙ␴⚥≛≐ḱ孖宫妋ẚ塩㱽)  [Labor Dispute Mediation and 
Arbitration Law (P.R.C.)]  (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l. People’s Cong., 
Dec. 29, 2007, effective May 1, 2008) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 
(P.R.C.) [hereinafter Labor Arbitration Law]; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Jiuye 
Cujin Fa (୰⋶Ṣ㮹ℙ␴⚥⯙᷂Ὣ徃㱽) [Employment Promotion Law (P.R.C.)] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l. People’s Cong., Aug. 30, 2007, effective 
Jan. 1, 2008) STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. (P.R.C.) 
67. China’s social insurance system was instituted as part of the transition to 
market-based labor relations under the Labor Law. See Labor Law, supra note 4, ch. 9. 
The regulation and administration of social insurance benefits is now governed by the 
2010 Social Insurance Law. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shehui Baoxian Fa  (୰⋶
Ṣ㮹ℙ␴⚥䣦Ểᾅ昑㱽) [Social Insurance Law (P.R.C.)] (promulgated by the Standing 
Comm. Nat’l. People’s Cong., Oct. 28, 2010, effective July 1, 2011) STANDING COMM. 
NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. (P.R.C.). Social insurance is partially funded by mandatory 
employer and employee contributions to five basic insurance funds based on 
withholding rates set at the local level: pension, health, disability and occupational 
injury, unemployment, and maternity insurance. Labor Law, supra note 4, at ch. IX; 
Social Insurance Law, supra chs. VII–VIII. 
68. See, e.g., supra note 27 and accompanying text; see also Labor Law, supra note 4 
at § 16 (written contracts); id. §§ 41–44 (limits on overtime); id. §§ 32,  50 (prohibitions 
on bonded labor and abusive practices); id. ch. IX (social insurance). 
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regulations. The indeterminacy of the Labor Law was 
complicated by the proliferation of regulations, judicial 
interpretations, and informal implementation practices at the 
local level, on top of prior authorities, much of which was 
neither transparent nor readily accessible to the firms and 
employees it governed.69 In fact, an important contribution of 
the LCL, like the Labor Law before it, was its effort to codify 
prior administrative regulations and judicial interpretations, 
adding clarity and clout to existing law. This pattern is typical of 
legislative reform in China, which often begins with local 
experimentation and ad hoc administrative guidance, followed 
by a national legislative effort that in many respects codifies 
prior regulation, which itself then generates a new baseline for 
interpretative guidance to emerge.70 
Second, the Labor Law attempted to strike a balance 
between employers’ need for flexibility, on the one hand, and 
consistent minimum protections for all workers in the economy, 
on the other. As Gallagher and Dong have observed, the Labor 
Law paved the way for state sector reform and the emergence of 
labor markets in the Chinese economy by freeing employers 
from the constraints of the command economy and the “iron 
rice bowl” of cradle-to-grave employment. While weighted on 
the side of employer autonomy, the law also sought to increase 
oversight of the burgeoning private sector. Accordingly, it 
established a new regulatory model built on contractual 
employment relationships.71 It said nothing about dispatched 
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69. For example, the resolution of labor disputes occupies one chapter of the 
Labor Law, but spawned a vast body of implementing authority, some conflicting. 
Labor Law, supra note 4, ch. X. For a survey of the related regulations, see VIRGINIA 
HARPER HO, LABOR DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CHINA: IMPLICATIONS FOR LABOR RIGHTS 
& LEGAL REFORM 36–47, 55–81 (2004). 
70 . This pattern is widely recognized. See, e.g., ALBERT H.Y. CHEN, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 141 (4th 
ed. 2011) (acknowledging the role of local regulations as a precursor to national 
reform); Hilary K. Josephs, Measuring Progress Under China’s Labor Law: Goals, Processes, 
Outcomes, 30 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 373, 384 (2008) (citing examples from the LCL’s 
provisions on severance pay and its codification of a 2006 judicial interpretation 
permitting direct litigation of certain unpaid wage claims). 
71. On the goals and legislative history of the Labor Law and the LCL, see 
generally Mary E. Gallagher & Dong Baohua, Legislating Harmony: Labour Law Reform in 
Contemporary China, in FROM IRON RICE BOWL TO INFORMALIZATION: MARKETS, 
WORKERS, AND THE STATE IN CHANGING CHINA 36 (Sarosh Kuruvilla, Ching Kwan Lee & 
Mary E. Gallagher eds., 2011). 
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workers and little about other nonstandard employment 
relationships.72  The ACFTU and other labor advocates later 
challenged the Labor Law’s approach as offering inadequate 
protection for employees, leading to calls for new legislation.73 
The inherent contradictions between the twin goals of the 
reform inevitably led to tensions and deficiencies in 
implementation, and ultimately triggered the next phase of the 
recursive reform process. 
Although the “diagnostic struggles” that preceded the 
Labor Law’s passage are not fully transparent, strong ideological 
differences clearly shaped the final form of the legislation.74 In 
addition, “actor mismatch” between state-sector firms, the 
ACFTU, and officials involved in the drafting process, on the 
one hand, and the local officials and firms charged with its 
implementation, on the other, have contributed to the 
resistance, evasion, and outright conflict that hampered the 
success of the Labor Law as a vehicle for worker rights.75 
The drafting process of the LCL brought the diagnostic 
struggles of the late 1990s and early 2000s to the fore. Internal 
debate among the drafters centered on the extent to which the 
new law should favor employees or maintain a more neutral 
stance.76 Two drafts of the legislation were released for public 
comment, attracting intense public debate and a record number 
of recommendations from foreign and domestic business 
organizations, trade union representatives, and labor advocacy 
groups.77 While the final version responded to some of the 
concerns of the business community, other provisions that had 
faced strong opposition were retained. Most obvious among 
these were limits on terminations, new rules on indefinite (i.e. 
non-fixed term) contracts, and expanded severance 

72. The Labor Law does contain provisions on probationary periods; it also 
encourages self-employment and the state’s establishment of labor services agencies to 
aid job-seekers. See Labor Law, supra note 4, arts. 10, 11, 21 (self-employment, 
employment services, and probation). 
73. On the competing interests represented in the LCL drafting process, see 
generally Gallagher & Dong, supra note 71. 
74. See generally id. 
75. See, e.g., CHING KWAN LEE, AGAINST THE LAW: LABOR PROTESTS IN CHINA’S 
RUSTBELT AND SUNBELT 20, 176–82 (2007). 
76. See JOSEPHS, supra note 65, at 381–83 (citations omitted) (outlining the poles 
of the debate). 
77. See generally Gallagher & Dong, supra note 71. 
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requirements.78 The LCL, not surprisingly, bears the imprint of 
the competing “diagnoses” and reform visions expressed in the 
drafting process, which sowed the seeds for the most recent 
round of reforms. 
In contrast to the Labor Law, which was designed to give 
employers new flexibility and promote workforce mobility,79 the 
LCL was more clearly weighted toward employees. 80  It 
significantly strengthened formal protections for employees and 
reduced much of the indeterminacy created by the Labor Law 
and related implementing measures.81 The LCL emphasized 
contracts of unlimited duration by providing that failure to 
enter into a written contract would give rise as a matter of law to 
a contract for an unlimited term, entitling the employee to 
generous severance and added protections from termination.82 
It also increased severance obligations, and provided that 
employees hired under two successive fixed-term contracts must 
be hired for an indefinite term.83 
The LCL also adopted a combined carrot-and-stick 
approach to incentivize employer compliance that has improved 
formal compliance with some of its basic mandates. 84  It 
toughened penalties for common violations, for example, by 
adding teeth to the existing rule requiring written labor 
contracts.85 Its implementation mobilized workers to enforce the 
LCL, opening the door to stronger grassroots support for the 
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78. See Harper Ho, supra note 62, at 68–71 (discussing these provisions); Sean 
Cooney et al., China’s New Labour Contract Law: Responding to the Growing Complexity of 
Labour Relations in the PRC, 30 UNSW L. J. 788, 793-802 (2007) (same). 
79. These features were seen as essential to promoting effective state sector 
reform. See Harper Ho, supra note 62, at 69 (discussing the goals of the Labor Law). 
80. See generally Gallagher & Dong, supra note 71 (analyzing the drafting process 
and interest groups behind the LCL). 
81. For a survey of the key changes, see generally Cooney et al., supra note 78. 
82. LCL, supra note 1,  art. 20. 
83. Id. arts. 14(3), 46–47. 
84 . See Harper Ho, supra note 62, at 89–100 (discussing early impacts on 
implementation of the labor contract requirement). For more recent evidence, see 
generally Gallagher et al., supra note 30. 
85. LCL, supra note 1,  arts. 14, 82. The LCL provides that if an employer failed to 
sign a written employment contract with an employee within one year, the employee is 
entitled to punitive damages of twice the employee’s salary; thereafter, any employee 
without a written contract is deemed to have obtained an indefinite-term contract. Id. 
See also Harper Ho, supra note 62, at 73, 76–78 (discussing these provisions). 
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new rules, which further weakened actor mismatch between the 
legislative process and the implementation phase. 
As a result of these changes, China’s labor law is formally 
now stricter than in many developing countries.86 At the time, 
the LCL was rightly hailed by labor advocates as a major step 
forward for China’s workers. Employers decried the LCL as too 
much, too fast.87 Many of the new measures inevitably raised 
labor costs, either by foreclosing avenues for cost-cutting non-
compliance or by imposing new affirmative obligations.88 
The broader context of the LCL’s passage—that is, factors 
exogenous to the lawmaking and implementation cycle—made 
its real and perceived burden on employers who were already 
under pressure even heavier. The ACFTU and its local branches 
had been working before 2008 to meet targets for organizing 
domestic and foreign-invested employers and initiating 
collective contract and wage negotiations.89 Urban areas were 
already steadily raising the statutory minimum wage in response 
to persistent labor shortages and heightened worker 
expectations.90 Pressure on employers mounted further in May 
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86. Gallagher et al., supra note 30, at 2 and sources cited therein. 
87. See Harper Ho, supra note 62, at 89–93 (surveying early responses to the 
legislation). 
88. Gallagher et al. have presented the first evidence of the widely anticipated cost 
impact on employers. See Gallagher et al., supra note 30, at 21–23. 
89 . See Harper Ho, From Contracts to Compliance, supra note 62, at 86–87 
(discussing these efforts). After a hiatus in 2008 and 2009 during the financial crisis, 
these efforts resumed. See Feng & Cai, supra note 44, at 7 (reporting on the ACFTU’s 
2010 campaigns). 
90. Shifting migration patterns are a primary cause of these labor shortages, as 
migrant workers increasingly seek opportunities inland. See Chong Qing & Jin Tang, 
Changing Migration Patterns: Welcome Home, ECONOMIST, Feb. 25, 2012, at 53–55; Jialu 
Liu et al., Chinese Workers: Under Threat or a Threat to American Workers? (Ind. Univ. 
Research Cntr. for Chinese Politics and Business Working Paper No. 2 2010), available 
at  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1673207. Migrant worker ambitions and expectations, as 
well as rights consciousness, are also rising and increase upward pressure on wages and 
labor standards. See, e.g., Ouyang Juan, Xin Shengdai Nongmingong de Jiazhiguan Yanjiu (
ᯠ⭏ԓߌ≁ᐕⲴԧ٬㿲⹄ウ) [Research on the Worldview of the New Generation of 
Migrant Workers], 6 FAZHI YU SHEHUI [LAW & SOC’Y] 190 (2012); Zhang Min, 
Xinshengdai Nongmingong Zhong de Butong Renqun: Dui Liyi Suqiu he Qunti Shijian de 
Taidu Fenxi (ᯠ⭏ԓߌ≁ᐕѝⲴн਼Ӫ㗔˖ሩ࡙⳺䇹≲઼㗔փһԦⲴᘱᓖ࠶᷀) [A 
Different Group of New Generation Migrant Workers: Analysis of Attitudes toward Their 
Expectations and Collective Incidents], 2 ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN YANJIU [CHINA YOUTH 
RES.] 65 (2013). In China, the minimum wage is set at the provincial, rather than the 
national, level. On current trends, see Growing Demand, supra note 40, at 16 (reporting 
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2008, shortly after the LCL took effect, when a new national-
level law on labor dispute mediation and arbitration lowered 
procedural and financial barriers, expanding employees’ ability 
to pursue legal claims for violations of employment laws.91 The 
combined effect of the LCL and greater access to labor 
arbitration and the courts was an immediate exponential 
upsurge in labor disputes—in some jurisdictions, caseloads 
soared by as much as three hundred percent.92 
The timing could hardly have been worse for companies. By 
unhappy coincidence, the onset of the financial crisis 
compounded the effect of these dramatic changes, creating a 
“perfect storm” for local and foreign employers in China. Many 
companies went out of business, and trade and industry groups 
petitioned the central government to suspend enforcement of 
the LCL, although ultimately no formal action was taken to 
lessen its bite.93 Not surprisingly, employers began to look for 
loopholes in the LCL, and they found them in the rules 
governing labor dispatch. 
C. Nonstandard Workers Under the Labor Contract Law 
As early as 2007, many observers predicted that the legal 
restrictions and costs associated with the new rules, and 
particularly those surrounding termination and severance, 
would incentivize employers to expand part-time and labor 
dispatch hiring. 94 According to one survey of 417 employers in 
the Pearl River Delta conducted in 2007 and early 2008, about 
thirty percent of the respondents reported plans to rely more 
heavily on labor dispatch after the LCL took effect.95 These early 
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that six provinces and a number of major cities have seen double-digit wage increases 
in recent years). 
91. Labor Arbitration Law, supra note 66. On the Labor Dispute Mediation and 
Arbitration Law, see Harper Ho, supra note 62, at 67, 74–82. 
92. See id. at 95–98 (discussing these trends). This surge declined to more modest 
levels after 2009. LAODONG TONGJI NIANJIAN 2012 [Labor Yearbook 2011] (2012), at 
368, tbl. 9-1. 
93. Harper Ho, supra note 62, at 87–89 and sources cited therein. 
94. See, e.g., Cooney et al., supra note 78, at 798, 800 (“One of the strongest 
impacts of the [LCL] is likely to be felt in the use of labour hire or ‘dispatch’ . . . 
workers.”). 
95. This survey was conducted by Job88.com, a human resource consulting 
service. Job88 Xin Laodong Hetong Fa Qiye Yingdui Qingkuang Diaocha Baogao 
(Job88 ᯠࣣࣘਸ਼⌅Աъᓄሩᛵߥ䈳ḕᣕ੺) [Job88 Survey Report on Enterprise 
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estimates turned out to be extremely conservative—the 
estimated number of dispatched workers is now more than 
double the levels before the LCL took effect in 2008.96  In 
Dongguan, a manufacturing center outside Guangzhou in south 
China, the number of temp agencies jumped over five hundred 
percent after 2008, not including unregistered firms. 97 
According to the drafters of the amendments, strong concerns 
among employers about the risks presented by the LCL’s rules 
on long-term contracts, high demand for cost-effective 
alternatives, ambiguities in the LCL, and low barriers to entry in 
the nascent labor services industry have all contributed to the 
rapid expansion of labor dispatch.98 
There is a certain irony in the fact that the LCL, which was 
designed to advance worker rights—and which appears in fact to 
have motivated greater adherence to formal protections for 
many employees99—has also directly facilitated both creative 
compliance and outright abuse of labor dispatch.100 In contrast 
to the Labor Law, the LCL contains an entire section governing 
the use of dispatched workers,101 as well as specific provisions on 
other forms of non-standard labor—probationary and part-time 
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Responses to the New Labor Contract Law], http://image3.job88.com/08/
dcb20080114/index.html (last visited Dec. 13, 2008). 
96. Growing Demand, supra note 40, at 15. 
97. A survey in 2010 conducted by the Dongguan labor bureau identified 512 
labor service agencies, up from 100 in 2008. 151 Laowu Paiqian Jigou Jin Hei Mingdan 
(151 ࣣ࣑⍮䚓ᵪᶴ䘋唁਽অ)[151 Labor Dispatch Agencies Blacklisted], DONGGUAN 
YANGGUANG WANG [DONGGUAN SUN NEWS], Nov. 24, 2010. 
98 . See, e.g., Preamble, Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Hetong Fa 
Xiuzhengan (Caoan) [Draft Amendments to the Labor Contract Law (P.R.C.)], 11TH 
STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. (P.R.C.), 27th Session, released for public 
comment July 6, 2012, available at http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/xinwen/lfgz/flca/2012-
07/06/content_1729107.htm [hereinafter LCL Draft Amendment]. 6000wan Ren 
Laowu Paiqian Renyuan Quanyi Nan Baozhang (6000 зࣣ࣑⍮䚓Ӫઈᵳ⳺䳮؍䳌)[60 
Million Temp Workers’ Rights are Hard to Protect], JINGJI RIBAO [ECON. DAILY], Feb. 28, 
2011 [hereinafter 60 Million Temp Workers’ Rights ] (reporting that labor dispatch has 
become “abnormally prosperous”). 
99. See generally Gallagher et al., supra note 30. 
100. This connection is widely recognized. See, e.g., Mei Lai & Yang Xin, Lun 
Laowu Paiqianzhong Laodongzhe Quanyi Baohu – Guanyu “Laodong Hetong Fa Diaoyan 
Wenjuan” de Shizheng Fenxi, 2 GUOJIA XINGZHENG XUEYUAN XUEBAO [NAT’L SCHOOL OF 
ADMIN. J.], Feb. 2011, 52–56 (tracing reactions to the LCL and assessing the LCL’s 
effect on dispatched workers). 
101. LCL, supra note 1, ch. 5(2), arts. 57–67. The Labor Law references only 
“employees” and “employing units.” 
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work.102  In many respects, it also anticipates and forecloses 
obvious potential abuses. By creating an alternative framework 
for hiring nonstandard workers, the LCL also responded to 
strong concerns raised by the business community during the 
drafting process about the rigidity and costs they anticipated 
from its tougher rules on hiring and dismissal.103 
All of these factors should have short-circuited the recursive 
loop. However, the LCL’s affirmation of labor dispatch and 
other forms of nonstandard work as an alternative to standard 
employment relationships, coupled with the indeterminacy of 
the new rules and a tougher enforcement environment, led to 
an over-expansion of labor dispatch and set the stage for the 
2013 amendments. In this respect, China’s experience is 
consistent with that of other jurisdictions that have seen an 
upsurge in outsourcing, hiring through intermediaries, and 
other forms of informal work when more protective legislation 
for standard hires is introduced. This Section introduces the key 
provisions of the LCL that addresses all forms of nonstandard 
work, with an emphasis on labor dispatch as a foundation for 
Part D’s survey of employer responses to the LCL. 
1. Probationary & Part-Time Work 
Part-time and probationary work are among the forms of 
nonstandard employment that are afforded new protections 
under the LCL yet offer employers added flexibility. “Part-time 
labor use” (feiquanrizhi yonggong 㠀඲᪥ไ⏝ᕤ) is defined as 
work that is generally compensated on an hourly basis and that 
does not exceed an average of 24 hours per week or 4 hours per 
day for the same employer.104 Part-time workers must be paid at 
least the local minimum wage and cannot be subject to a 
probationary term.105 However, they need not be hired under 
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102. Id. arts. 19–21, 68–72 (probationary  and part-time workers, respectively).  
103. See Cooney et al., supra note 78, at 796–800 (outlining the debate over 
indefinite-term contracting and termination rights for standard and nonstandard 
workers under the LCL). 
104 . LCL, supra note 78, art. 68. These rules replace earlier MOLSS 
interpretations that had offered expanded rights and defined part-time work as no 
more than 30 hours per week and 5 hours per day. RONALD C. BROWN, 
UNDERSTANDING LABOR & EMPLOYMENT LAW IN CHINA 30 (2008). 
105. Id. art. 70 (prohibiting probation); id. art. 72 (minimum wage). 
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written contract and can be dismissed at will without 
severance.106 
As under the Labor Law, employees may be hired on a 
probationary basis for up to six months.107 The LCL added new 
requirements that probationary employees cannot be 
terminated without cause. 108  They must be paid at least 
minimum wage and no less than eighty percent percent of the 
non-probationary rate.109 The possibility of a trial period lowers 
employers’ risk and cost even if the employee is ultimately 
retained. However, the time constraints on both part-time work 
and the use of probationary periods make them less useful to 
employers seeking to meet long-term, or even seasonal, hiring 
needs. 
2. Labor Dispatch & the Regulation of Employment Agencies 
Labor dispatch offers employers an opportunity to achieve 
greater flexibility and lower costs on a longer-term basis. Like 
workers hired through intermediaries in the United States, 
dispatched workers are formally employed by a labor services 
agency, which recruits workers and places them with requesting 
firms.110 The terms of this trilateral arrangement are governed 
by (i) a labor dispatch contract between the temp agency and 
the company using the dispatched workers111 and (ii) a labor 
contract between the worker and the temp agency, which is 
considered the dispatched worker’s direct employer.112 Under 
the LCL, both the temp agency and the company using the 
employee’s services have clear obligations toward the worker. In 
contrast to jurisdictions that place primary responsibility on 
either the temp agency or the labor-using firm, the LCL makes 
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106. Id. art. 69 (permitting oral contracts); id. art. 71 (requiring notice but no 
severance). 
107. Article 19 of the LCL also permits a shorter probationary period for short-
term contracts, but in all cases, no more than six months. LCL, supra note 1, art. 19. Cf. 
Labor Law, supra note 4, art. 21 (authorizing probationary terms up to six months). 
108. LCL, supra note 1, arts. 21, 32(1) (prohibiting termination without cause but 
allowing probationary employees to resign at will). 
109. Id. art. 20. 
110. Id. art. 58. 
111. Under Article 59 of the LCL, the labor dispatch contract between the temp 
agency and the hiring firm must specify, among other things, the compensation and 
insurance payments to which employees are entitled. 
112. Id. art. 58. 
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the temp agency and the hiring firm jointly and severally liable 
for violations that harm dispatched workers.113 
The temp agency is considered the formal employer and is 
therefore directly responsible for payment of wages and 
benefits; these funds are typically received from the labor-using 
entity under the terms of its contract with the temp agency, 
although the sourcing contract may stipulate which entity will 
actually disburse funds and provide specific benefits to 
dispatched workers. 114  The LCL explicitly prohibits temp 
agencies from assessing fees of any kind from dispatched 
workers or retaining any portion of their wages.115 Consistent 
with the 1995 Labor Law,116 dispatched employees also have an 
explicit right to “equal pay for equal work” (tonggong tongchou ྠ
ᕤྠ㓘), which is determined based on the compensation paid 
to standard employees of a comparable position in the labor-
using firm.117 
Although they may be assigned to a user firm on a 
temporary basis, dispatched workers must still be hired by the 
temp agency under a fixed-term labor contract for a minimum 
two-year term; they cannot be hired on a part-time basis.118 The 
temp agency is also responsible for paying dispatched workers at 
least the minimum wage during periods when they are not hired 
out, reducing the risk of downtime to the worker.119 They are 
also entitled to information about the “relevant content” of the 
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113. LCL, supra note 1, art. 92. This principle parallels the joint liability doctrine 
in the United States under which both the direct employer, such as the temp agency, 
and the unit for whom the employee works might share legal responsibility for 
purposes of the Fair Labor Standards Act if both are engaged in employment-related 
activities. See 29 C.F.R. § 791.2(a) (2012); see also Stone, Atypical Employees, supra note 
12, at 259 (discussing relevant authorities). 
114. LCL, supra note 1, art. 58. 
115. Id. art. 60. 
116. Id. art. 63. If the company does not have an employee in a comparable 
position, employees in the same locality can serve as the standard. Id. 
117. Id. art. 63; cf. Labor Law, supra note 4, art. 46 (stating that wage payments 
shall follow the principle of equal pay for equal work). If the company does not have an 
employee in a comparable position, employees in the same locality can serve as the 
standard. LCL, supra note 1, art. 63. 
118. Id.; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Hetong Shishi Tiaoli (୰⋶Ṣ㮹ℙ␴⚥
≛≐⎰⎴㱽⭆㕥㜉ἳĪ[Regulation on the Implementation of the Employment Contract Law 
(P.R.C.)] (promulgated by the State Council (P.R.C.), No. 535, Sept. 18, 2008, effective 
Sept. 18, 2008) [hereinafter LCL Implementing Regulations], art. 30 (prohibiting 
temp agency part-time hires). 
119. LCL, supra note 1, art. 58. 
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labor services contract between the temp agency and its client 
firm and have the right to join the union of either the temp 
agency or the labor-using entity.120 The labor-using entity, for its 
part, must provide working conditions that conform to national 
labor standards, inform temporary employees about their job 
requirements and compensation terms, pay overtime wages, 
bonuses, and benefits related to the position, and provide any 
necessary training.121 In addition, the LCL explicitly prohibits 
labor-using entities from using multiple short-term labor 
dispatch placement contracts to cover a continuous term of 
labor use, 122  from subcontracting or redispatching temp 
employees sourced elsewhere, and from setting up an internal 
temp agency. 123  However, other provisions appear to 
contemplate long-term labor dispatch use, since they require 
that normal wage adjustment be applied “in cases of continuous 
labor dispatch.”124 
3. Independent Contractors 
Hiring independent contractors is a third alternative to 
standard hiring that may reduce compliance risks and costs to 
the contracting firm. However, because the Labor Law and the 
LCL are directed at the parties to a labor relationship,125 they do 
not apply to independent contractors. Similarly, in the United 
States, many companies that come under fire for evading tax 
obligations and employment laws attempt to classify individual 
employees as independent contractors.126 In China, however, an 
individual employee cannot legally be a sole proprietor or 
independent contractor in their personal capacity without 
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120. Id. art. 60 (access to labor services contract content); id. art. 64 (right to join 
unions). 
121. Id. art. 62. 
122. Id. art. 59. 
123 . Id. arts. 62, 67 (banning redispatch and in-house or “captive” temp 
agencies). 
124. Id. art. 62. 
125. Labor Law, supra note 4, art. 2; LCL, supra note 1, art. 2. 
126. In 2013, for example, the US Department of Labor began an effort to 
crackdown on employers whom they believed were improperly classifying workers as 
independent contractors in order to avoid paying overtime and payroll taxes. Jennifer 
Smith, Labor Crackdown Heats Up, WALL ST. J., Mar. 4, 2013, at B6. 
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registering as a legal entity.127 Nonetheless, outsourcing offers 
employers a ready alternative to labor dispatch that also involves 
hiring employees of a third party to perform services at the user 
firm. The blurred line between these two approaches has only 
recently been addressed in the implementing rules for the 
amended LCL, as discussed in Part III below. 
*** 
As this brief summary shows, the LCL attempts to place 
dispatched workers on equal footing with standard employees 
with regard to the primary terms and conditions of employment. 
It also attempts to set clear rules to give employers the flexibility 
to hire dispatched workers. Nonetheless, the LCL’s 
implementation has revealed challenges that have motivated the 
next stage of the labor reform cycle. 
D. Measures & Countermeasures: Understanding Recursive Cycles 
The core puzzle of post-2008 labor reform is why the LCL’s 
efforts to promote compliance with long-standing legal rules 
have led so soon to the next phase of a recursive reform cycle 
that largely reemphasizes existing rules. An obvious response, of 
course, is that the LCL’s provisions on labor dispatch were new 
and untested in 2008, making later revisions in the light of 
experience almost inevitable.128 In addition, two key drivers of 
recursive cycles—ideological and structural contradictions and 
indeterminacy or ambiguities in the legislation itself—are 
readily apparent in the LCL rules that are the focus of the new 
amendments. The incentives created by the earlier legislation 
and the degree of regulatory distance it reflects are two further 
potential drivers of the reform process discussed below. While 
they are not part of Halliday and Carruthers’ initial framework, 
they usefully explain post-2008 responses to the LCL’s labor 
dispatch rules. 
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127. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongsi Fa (୰⋶Ṣ㮹ℙ␴⚥℔⎠㱽(2005
ಟ孊)) [Company Law (2005 Revision) (P.R.C.)] (as amended by the Standing Comm. 
Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2005, effective Jan. 1, 2006) [hereinafter PRC Company 
Law], STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. arts. 58–64 (P.R.C.). 
128. In Halliday and Carruthers’ terms, new legal rules often have unintended 
consequences that may create indeterminacy and undermine the goals of the initial 
reform, driving a new recursive cycle. See HALLIDAY & CARRUTHERS, supra note 8, at 
1149. 
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First, the LCL’s core ambivalence over whether to limit or 
encourage labor dispatch reflects the ideological and structural 
contradictions that polarized the LCL drafting process and 
ultimately resulted in few real limits on labor dispatch or labor 
services agencies.129 For example, Article 66 gives employers 
wide berth to expand their use of dispatched workers. It states 
that that “labor dispatch shall generally apply to temporary, 
auxiliary, or substitute positions.” 130  The use of the term 
“generally” implies that employers may use seconded workers 
beyond the “three conditions” listed in Article 66 and still be in 
compliance with the LCL. Moreover, neither “temporary,” 
“auxiliary,” or “substitute” are defined in the text. As a result, 
many employers have expanded their use of dispatched workers 
since 2008 in positions that were designed for (and in many 
cases also held by) direct hires or have even made temp hiring 
the base of their workforce.131 
The ambiguity of the LCL’s “equal pay for equal work” 
requirement has also driven employers’ over-reliance on labor 
dispatch. This requirement was already included in the Labor 
Law, which, like the LCL, uses the term “compensation” (chou
㓘) rather than “wages” (gongzi ᕤ峬).132 Although regulatory 
guidance from the Ministry of Finance requires employers to 
document many common fringe benefits, such as any monthly 
housing, transportation, or meal allowances, as “wages” (gongzi 
ᕤ峬),133 neither the LCL nor its 2008 implementing rules clarify 
whether “equal pay for equal work” also requires equal benefits 
and overtime wages. As of 2013, local rules in some provinces, 
including Chongqing, Shanghai, and Tianjin require both pay 
and benefit equality to some extent, but this interpretation is by 
no means universal.134 
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129. For evidence of this link, see Cooney et al., supra note 78. 
130. LCL, supra note 1, art. 66 (emphasis added). 
131. See Laowu Paiqian Lifa de Wudu ji Qi Wanshan (ࣣ࣑⍮䚓・⌅Ⲵ䈟䈫৺ަᆼ
ழ) [Misinterpretations of the Labor Dispatch Law and a Response], GONGREN RIBAO 
[WORKERS’ DAILY], Aug. 24, 2010 [hereinafter Misinterpretations]. 
132. Labor Law, supra note 4, art. 46. 
133. Caizhengbu Guanyu Qiye Jiaqiang Zhigong Fulifei Caiwu Guanli de Tongzhi  (䍒᭯
䜘ޣҾԱъ࣐ᕪ㙼ᐕ⾿࡙䍩䍒࣑㇑⨶Ⲵ䙊⸕) [Notice Regarding Strengthening the 
Financial Management of Employee Benefits] (promulgated by the Ministry of Fin., 
No. 242, 2009) art. 2 [hereinafter Finance Regulations]. 
134. Local rules in several provinces clarify that dispatched workers are entitled to 
receive equal pay and benefits, and, in some cases, mandate the use of equivalent wage 
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Many employers have enjoyed significant cost savings 
through technical compliance with the equal pay requirement 
in terms of base wages, while offering limited or no benefits to 
dispatched workers. 135  This has created major disparities 
between dispatched and standard workers.136 In addition, until 
quite recently, companies could hire dispatched workers from 
agencies in cheaper jurisdictions to take advantage of lower 
social insurance withholding rates.137 
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allocation methods. See Tianjinshi Renli Ziyuan he Shehui Baozhangju, Tianjinshi 
Gongshang Xingzheng Guanlijuˈ Tianjinshi Laowu Paiqian Guanfa (ཙ⍕ᐲࣣ࣑⍮䚓㇑⨶
࣎⌅) [Regulations on the Administration of Labor Dispatch of Tianjin Municipality] 
(promulgated by the Tianjin Human Res. & Soc. Sec. Bureau & Tianjin Admin. for 
Indus. & Commerce, No. 76, Sept. 16, 2011, effective Sept. 20, 2011 to Sept. 20, 2016) 
art. 9 [hereinafter Tianjin Labor Dispatch Regulations] (requiring equal wages and 
benefits); Chongqingshi Zhigong Quanyi Baozhang Tiaoli (䟽ᒶᐲ㙼ᐕᵳ⳺؍䳌ᶑֻ) 
[Chongqing Regulation on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Employees] 
(promulgated by the Standing Committee of the Tianjin People’s Cong., No. 8, Mar. 
25, 2011, effective July 1, 2011) art. 28 [hereinafter Chongqing Regulations]; cf. Liaoning 
Sheng Zhigong Laodong Quanyi Baozhang Tiaoli (䗭ᆱⴱ㙼ᐕᵳ⳺؍䳌ᶑֻ) [Liaoning 
Regulations on the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Employees] (promulgated 
by the Liaoning People’s Cong., June 3, 2013), available at http://npc.people.com.cn/
n/2013/0603/c14576-21719165.html (requiring employers to apply the same wage 
allocation method but not mandating equal benefits). This issue has now been 
addressed by the Labor Dispatch Provisions, discussed infra, Part II.B.  
135 . The amendments’ drafters formally acknowledged the sometimes wide 
disparities in benefits and social insurance coverage of temp workers in the Draft 
Amendment of the LCL (supplemental explanation). See LCL Draft Amendment  supra 
note 98, para. 3. 
136. Dangqian Woguo Laowu Paiqian Yonggong Xiankuang Diaocha (ᖃࡽޘഭࣣ࣑⍮
䚓⭘ᐕ⧠ߥ䈳ḕ) [Investigation of the Situation of Today’s Dispatched Workers], 2012 
CHINA LABOR 5, 24 [hereinafter ACFTU Investigation] (reporting findings from local 
trade union surveys).  Tax regulations limit benefits to no more than fourteen percent 
of wages.  Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Qiye Suode Shuifa Shishi Tiaoli (ѝॾӪ≁ޡ
઼ഭԱъᡰᗇ〾⌅ᇎᯭᶑֻ) [Enterprise Income Tax Law Implementing Regulations 
(P.R.C.)] (promulgated by the State Council, No. 512, Dec. 6, 2007, effective Jan. 1, 
2008) (P.R.C.),  art. 40. 
137. Disparities in social insurance withholding rates have been eliminated by the 
LCL amendments. See Labor Dispatch Provisions, supra note 34, art. 28 (requiring 
social insurance to be based on the user firm’s jurisdiction). These gaps had already 
diminished by 2013 as local governments implemented the 2011 Social Insurance Law 
with local rules targeting this problem. See, e.g., Guangdong Sheng Qiye Zhigong Jiben 
Yanglao Baoxian Shengji Tongdeng Shishi Fangan (ᒯьⴱԱъ㙼ᐕสᵜޫ㘱؍䲙ⴱ㓗
㔏ㅹᇎᯭᯩṸ) [Guangdong Province Enterprise Workers’ Basic Pension Insurance 
Uniform Provincial Implementation Measures] (promulgated by the Guangdong 
Provincial People’s Government, No. 15, Feb. 25, 2009, effective Feb. 25, 2009 (P.R.C.) 
(requiring withholding rates across Guangdong to converge to a uniform standard as 
of 2012); see also Tianjin Labor Dispatch Provisions, supra note 134, art. 7 (requiring 
social insurance payments to be based on the applicable rate for the labor-using firm). 
1004 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:973 
The expansion of the labor services industry has also 
advanced largely in technical compliance with the LCL. Under 
its original terms, the only requirements to establish a labor 
services agency were a standard business registration and 
registered capital of RMB¥500,000 (about US$81,000), both of 
which could be easily met.138 No regulatory authorization was 
required. 139  Skyrocketing demand for temp hires and the 
profitability of the sector combined with a lack of formal 
oversight mechanisms to fuel an explosion in the number of 
temp agencies.140 In Guangdong, for example, recent estimates 
put the number of temp agencies in the province at over 3000, 
with over 2 million dispatched workers.141 Since 2008, the need 
for heightened regulation of the industry has become readily 
apparent and has helped to motivate the recent amendments. 
Beyond the factors identified by Halliday and Carruthers, 
the literature on regulatory compliance suggests new 
dimensions of the recursivity model that go further in 
explaining why and when a new cycle of reform might arise. 
Bardach and Kagan’s work observes, first, that when the 
demands of new legislation are high relative to current business 
practice, avoidance, evasion, and outright resistance are more 
likely, particularly when regulated firms’ ability or will to comply 
is low.142 In other words, the degree of regulatory distance the 
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138. LCL, supra note 1, art. 57. At the time, the general registered capital 
requirement for a limited liability company under the PRC Company Law was 
RMB¥30,000 (US$4,900). PRC Company Law, supra note 127, art. 26. 
139 . Prior to 2010, local regulations in Shandong Province did impose an 
additional permitting requirement. Guanyu Guifan Laowu Paiqian Qiye Dengji Guanli 
Youguan Wentide Tongzhi (ޣҾ㿴㤳ࣣ࣑⍮䚓Աъⲫ䇠㇑⨶ᴹޣ䰞仈Ⲵ䙊⸕) [Notice 
Regarding Problems in the Scope of Labor Dispatch Registration Management] 
(promulgated by the Shandong Province Human Resources and Social Security 
Bureau, Shandong Province Administration for Industry and Commerce, No. 690 (Oct. 
18, 2010) (rescinding the rule). 
140. See, e.g., Guifan Laowu Paiqian Kaoyan Lifa Zhihui (㿴㤳ࣣ࣑⍮䚓㘳傼・⌅ᤷ 
ᥕ) [Regularizing Labor Dispatch Tests Legislative Wisdom] (June 26, 2012), available 
at www.worker.cn.cn (linking the rapid growth of labor dispatch to the passage of the 
LCL).  
141. Yonggong Danwei Laowu Paiqiangong Zhongshu Bu De Chaoguo 3Cheng (⭘ᐕঅ
սࣣ࣑⍮䚓ᐕᙫᮠнᗇ䎵䗷 ᡀ) [Temp Hires Cannot Exceed 30 Percent of the Workforce], 
DONGGUAN RIBAO [DONGGUAN DAILY], Apr. 18, 2012. 
142 . See EUGENE BARDACH & ROBERT A. KAGAN, GOING BY THE BOOK: THE 
PROBLEM OF REGULATORY UNREASONABLENESS 93–119 (1982) (identifying some of the 
negative effects of tough regulations and aggressive enforcement). Bardach and Kagan 
also note that when tough regulations are directed at only a minority of firms, the rules 
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reform represents can directly affect its legitimacy and impact. 
Ayres and Braithwaite, among others, also stress that the mix of 
positive and negative incentives incorporated in the reform can 
directly affect how successfully it will be adopted, and that the 
choice between alternative incentives may depend on whether 
the target population is compliance-minded or resistant.143 The 
implementation of the LCL bears out these observations.144 
One area where the regulatory distance between the LCL’s 
standards and firm practice has been particularly wide are in the 
LCL’s rules governing the choice of contract term. Historically, 
most employment contracts in China, particularly in 
manufacturing, have been for one- or two-year terms. In order 
to foster stable employment relationships, the LCL adopted 
controversial provisions that favor contracts for an indefinite 
term. Such contracts can be created as a matter of law by the 
renewal of two fixed-term contracts of any length.145 They also 
give rise to severance benefits based on years of service and can 
only be terminated on grounds provided for in the LCL.146 
Through labor dispatch, in contrast, an employer can  simply 
return the worker to the temp agency if their services are no 
longer needed without liability for severance.147 
At the same time, labor dispatch incentivized employers to 
attempt to shift the risks and costs of the LCL’s tough regulatory 
obligations to temp agencies. Although the original terms of the 
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may promote resentment and resistance from compliance-oriented firms. Id. at 92, 
112–16. 
143 . See, e.g., AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 6; Peter J. May, Compliance 
Motivations: Affirmative and Negative Bases, 38 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 41 (2004); Clifford 
Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of Environmental 
Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181 (1998). 
144. On the early implementation of the LCL, see Harper Ho, supra note 62, at 
83–98. 
145. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
146. Employers widely perceive such contracts as difficult and expensive to 
terminate. See Laowugong Lanyong Zhi Jiti Zhengyi Anjian Daliang Zengjia (ࣣ࣑ᐕ┕⭘㠤
䳶փҹ䇞ṸԦབྷ䟿໎࣐) [Disputes Arising from the Abuse of Labor Dispatch Soar], FAZHI 
RIBAO (⌅ࡦᰕᣕ) [LEGAL DAILY] (Feb. 27, 2012). 
147 . Under the LCL, only the legal employer is responsible for severance 
payments and consideration for any noncompete obligations imposed, although a 
labor services agreement could contractually impose costs on a user firm that returns a 
dispatched worker. LCL, supra note 1, art. 47.  The 2014 implementing rules now 
require temp agencies to provide severance to dispatched workers in accordance with 
the LCL.  See Labor Dispatch Provisions, supra note 34, arts. 14–17. 
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LCL impose clear obligations on the labor-using firm, China’s 
labor and employment laws, like those in the United States, are 
based on employment status. As a result, temp agencies bear 
greater legal responsibility for dispatched workers than the 
labor-using firm as a practical reality, and many employers saw 
labor dispatch as a way to push workplace injury compensation 
costs or other legal obligations to the temp agency as the 
primary employer; some of these would ultimately, if not legally, 
be passed on to the employee.148 This reality, coupled with the 
fly-by-night nature of many temp agencies, which were largely 
unregulated, shielded labor-using firms but often left workers 
unable to pursue legal claims in the event a violation occurred. 
The unintended effects of other regulatory mandates can 
also expand regulatory distance and, in the employment 
context, can drive firms to rely more heavily on labor dispatch 
and other forms of nonstandard employment. For example, in 
the United States, many employment mandates, including the 
Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”), Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 
only apply to firms who have more than a specified threshold 
number of employees or employees who work for a specified 
period of time; because only direct employees are counted, 
outsourcing and part-time hiring can help some employers 
remain exempt from these requirements.149 Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that many US employers may be relying more heavily 
on temp hires and part-time employees to avoid the added 
health insurance costs required by the 2010 Patient Protection 
and Affordable Care Act for firms employing more than fifty 
people who work more than thirty hours per week.150 Similarly, 

148. See Misinterpretations, supra note 131 (arguing that temp hiring under the 
LCL does not create cost savings). Although contractual risk shifting from the statutory 
employer to the user firm has been authorized by certain local regulations, as in 
Shanghai, contractual provisions cannot contravene statutory mandates. See, e.g., 
Shanghaishi Laodong Hetong Tiaoli (к⎧ᐲࣣࣘਸ਼ᶑֻ) [Shanghai Labor Contract 
Regulations] (promulgated by the Shanghai Mun. People’s Cong., Nov. 15, 2001, 
effective May 1, 2002), arts. 25, 28 (P.R.C.). 
149. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981a(b)(3), 2000e(b) (2012) (“[E]mployer’ means a person . . 
. who has fifteen or more employees . . .”). For further discussion of these limits, see 
Stone, Atypical Employees, supra note 12, at 256–80; Befort, supra note 19, at 164–70. 
150. Patrice Hill, “Obamacare” Benefits Mandate Could Further Phase Out Full-Time 
Work, WASH. TIMES, June 16, 2013, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/
jun/16/obamacare-benefits-mandate-could-further-phase-out/?page=all; Will 
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in China, a key reason why China’s major SOEs and other large 
firms, who typically are under far less cost pressure to do so, 
have been the most dependent on labor dispatch is because it 
allows firms to more easily satisfy reporting requirements and 
performance targets that are measured with reference to 
standard employees.151 This strategy has also allowed these firms 
to use the resulting cost savings to expand benefits and salaries 
for executives and other standard employees. 152 
The prevalence of practices that are explicitly illegal under 
the LCL is further evidence of the wide regulatory distance 
between the LCL’s standards and existing compliance norms. 
These include paying dispatched workers lower base wages than 
direct hires doing the same work,153 charging management or 
placement fees to dispatched employees, 154  using successive 
short-term contracts to mask a long-term employment 
relationship as a “temporary” labor dispatch position,155 and 
creating in-house temp agencies to transfer responsibility from 
the parent company for workers in fact “dispatched” back to the 
parent.156 Not surprisingly, labor dispatch and other forms of 
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Obamacare Destroy Jobs?, ECONOMIST (Aug. 24, 2013), http://www.economist.com/
blogs/democracyinamerica/2013/08/health-reform-and-employment. 
151. These include, for example, workplace safety measures and per capita 
production targets. See Guowuyuan Guoyou Zichan Jiandu Guanli Weiyuanhui Guanyu 
Yinfa 2013 Niandu Zhongyang Qiye Yusuan Baobiao de Tongzhi (ഭ࣑䲒ഭᴹ䍴ӗⴁⶓ㇑⨶
ငઈՊޣҾঠਁ 2013 ᒤᓖѝཞԱъ亴㇇ᣕ㺘Ⲵ䙊⸕) [SASAC Notice Regarding the 2013 
Centrally Administered SOEs Budget Reporting Form], No. 156, Sept. 25, 2012. 
152. Ma Hanqing, Laowu Paiqian Tiekongzi, Qiye Yue Sheng 20wan, YANGCHENG 
WANBAO [GUANGZHOU NIGHTLY REP.], Mar. 7, 2011. 
153. See, e.g., Growing Demand, supra note 40, at 16 (reporting that temps at 
Nokia’s factory in Dongguan, Guangdong are paid about seventy-five percent of a 
direct Nokia employee’s wage and are not permitted to join the union or live in the 
employee dormitory). 
154. Id. at 15 (reporting typical placement fees paid by workers in 2012 at around 
RMB¥200 (US$30)); cf. LCL, supra note 1, art. 60 (prohibiting such fees). 
155. All of these practices have been widely reported by Chinese media sources 
and labor activists. They are also acknowledged by authorities who promise to crack 
down as part of the implementation of the LCL amendments. See, e.g., ACFTU 
Investigation, supra note 136, at 24; China Tightens Loophole on Hiring Temporary Workers, 
REUTERS (Dec. 28, 2012), www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/28/us-china-labor-
idUSBRE8BR04120121228 (discussing the common practice of hiring from an internal 
“temp agency”). In 2012, the vice chairman of the Standing Committee of the National 
People’s Congress promised increased inspections to catch violators who split long-
term contracts into shorter ones to justify a “temporary” position. Id. 
156. See generally ACFTU Investigation, supra note 136. See also IHLO Report, 
supra note 43; China Labour Bulletin, Amendments to the Labour Contract Law of the 
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nonstandard work have led to a rise in labor conflict, both in the 
courts and on the streets.157 
In sum, the LCL’s tougher standards, coupled with 
heightened enforcement efforts by labor authorities post-2008, 
represented a high degree of regulatory distance from prior 
firm practice. Because the excessive reliance on labor dispatch 
observed today is not clearly prohibited by the LCL, employers 
were quick to take advantage of its benefits. From one 
perspective then, the rapid expansion of labor dispatch offers 
some evidence that the law works, motivating employers to take 
advantage of legal cost-cutting opportunities. At the same time, 
the LCL over-incentivized other firms to illegally expand their 
reliance on dispatched workers. 
The overuse of dispatched workers to fill what are 
essentially regular employee positions, whether legally or 
illegally, has undermined the stated goals of the LCL in a 
number of ways. First, the dual responsibility of temp agencies 
and labor-using firms should have given dispatched workers 
added protections, but has in fact produced a reality where 
neither assumes responsibility.158 Even though the LCL clearly 
identifies the temp agency as the legal employer and creates 
clear legal obligations for both the labor-using firm and the 
temp agency, the triangular nature of the relationship and the 
potential for contractual risk-shifting can create ambiguity about 
where responsibility for the employee lies. For example, temp 
agencies may fail to remit social insurance premiums, but the 
funds are ultimately the legal obligation of the labor-using 
employer, which should be specified in its contract with the 

People’s Republic of China (Draft): Comments and Recommendations, par. 13 (Aug. 
22, 2012), available at http://www.clb.org.hk/en/sites/default/files/File/
labour%20contract%20law%20ammedments.pdf. 
157. See Diaoyan Laowu Paiqian Zhidu [An Investigation of the Dispatch Labor System], 
ZHONGGUO XINWEN ZHOUKAN [CHINA NEWS WEEKLY], June 30, 2011 (reporting on 
findings of the Shanghai Huangpu district court and on threatened suicides of labor 
dispatch workers in Guangzhou); Laowu Gong Lanyong Zhi Jiti Zhengyi Anjian Daliang 
Zengjia [Collective Disputes Challenging the Abuse of Labor Dispatch Workers 
Increases Significantly], LEGAL DAILY, Feb. 27, 2012. 
158. The most widely cited media source on the extent of labor dispatch observes 
that because “the recruiter doesn’t use the worker and the hiring firm doesn’t 
recruit . . . dispatch workers find themselves in a situation where neither one monitors 
(liangbuguan ୩୙⟶).” See Jiang, Authoritative Report, supra note 34. 
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temp agency.159 Employees are often unfamiliar with these rules. 
Second, as a result of high turnover, short-term contracting, and 
labor dispatch, employees are rarely able to accumulate the 
years of service upon which severance depends. 160  These 
common practices have undermined the LCL’s stated goal—
promoting stability by encouraging indefinite- and long-term 
contracts. 
The LCL’s promise of equality for labor dispatch workers 
has not been fully realized, in part because labor law reform has 
created a dynamic cycle of action and reaction. Supporters of 
the new amendments hope they will promote the original goals 
of the LCL—encouraging stable, longer term employment 
relationships, while offering flexibility to employers. Part II 
surveys the improvements made in the 2013 amendments and 
their implementing rules and considers their potential to 
restore a more balanced role for dispatched labor in the 
Chinese economy. 
II. THE AMENDED LABOR CONTRACT LAW: REFORM 
REPRISE 
The significance of the LCL amendments is evident from 
the drafting process, which attracted over 550,000 online 
responses—a new record—during a month-long public 
comment period, as well as widespread attention from foreign 
and domestic employers in China, academics, and labor 
advocacy groups.161 The amendments were spearheaded by the 
ACFTU and drew on proposals by the legal inspection 
commission of the National People’s Congress’ Standing 

159. LCL, supra note 1, art. 58. See Amendments to the Labor Contract Law of the 
PRC (Draft): Comments & Recommendations, CHINA LAB. BULL. (raising this 
concern). 
160. See 60 Million Temp Workers’ Rights, supra note 98 (citing the 2011 ACFTU 
report); Jiangxi: Duangonghua Xianxiang Tuisheng “Xingong Huang” [Jiangxi: 
Phenomenon of “Short-Term Work” Gives Rise to “New Labor Shortage”], JIANGXI 
DAILY, Feb. 8, 2012 (reporting survey results showing that the average worker stays in 
the same position about two years and many for far less). 
161. Chen Xin & Zhao Yinan, Revised Labor Law Attracts Public Attention, CHINA 
DAILY, Aug. 7, 2012, http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2012-08/07/
content_15649439.htm (noting that the LCL itself set new records for online feedback 
when first drafted, attracting nearly 190,000 submissions). These figures do not include 
written submissions. 
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Committee, investigations conducted by the Ministry of Human 
Resources and Social Security (“MOHRSS”) and the ACFTU, 
and various reports from local union federations into the use of 
dispatched labor.162 In addition, a number of provincial-level 
governments had passed specific local rules to respond to the 
rise in labor dispatch hiring, some of which influenced the 
substance of the amendments.163  The implementing rules for 
the new amendments also reflect strong controversy; over 30,000 
comments were received in the first month, and the comment 
draft was substantially revised before release in final form.164  
The final product appears to be a compromise that strictly limits 
labor dispatch, but stops short of key enforcement innovations 
that were present in the initial draft.  
Like early labor law reforms in the United States,165 the 
amended LCL is intended primarily to promote social stability 

162. See IHLO Report, supra note 43 (reporting on the legislative background of 
the proposed amendments). The results of these investigations are documented, in 
part, in ACFTU Investigation, supra note 128. 
163. These jurisdictions include: Chongqing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Jilin, Guangdong 
(draft), Liaoning, and Yunnan. See Chongqing Regulation, supra note 134; Shanghai 
Dept. of Human Resources and Social Security, Shanghai Federation of Trade Unions, 
Shanghai Assoc of Enterprises, and Shanghai Administration of Industry and 
Commerce, [Guidance on Regulating the Administration of Labor Dispatch in 
Shanghai Municipality] (promulgated May 26, 2011); Guanyu Guifan Benshi Laowu 
Paiqian Yonggong Guanli de Ruogan Yijian (ޣҾ㿴㤳ᵜᐲࣣ࣑⍮䚓⭘ᐕ㇑⨶Ⲵ㤕ᒢ᜿
㿱) [Several Opinions on Regulating the Administration of Labor Dispatch in Shanghai 
Municipality (Trial Implementation)] (promulgated Feb. 26, 2012, effective. Feb.26, 
2012–Dec. 31, 2013); Tianjinshi Laowu Paiqian Guanli Banfa (ཙ⍕ᐲࣣ࣑⍮䚓㇑⨶࣎
⌅) [Regulations on the Administration of Labor Dispatch] (promulgated by Tianjin 
Human Resources and Social Security Bureau and the Tianjin Administration of 
Industry and Commerce, Sept. 16, 2011, effective Sept. 20, 2011–Sept. 20, 2016); 
Jilinsheng Laowu Paiqian Guanli Banfa (ਹ᷇ⴱࣣ࣑⍮䚓㇑⨶࣎⌅) [Regulations on the 
Administration of Labor Dispatch of Jilin Province], No. 98 (promulgated by the Jilin 
Provincial Human Resources and Social Security Bureauon Nov. 22, 2011, effective 
Jan. 1, 2012); Guangdongsheng Laowu Paiqian Guanli Guiding (Zhengqiu Yijia Gao) (
ᒯьⴱࣣࣣ঴⍮䚓㇑⨶㿴ᇊ (ᖱ≲᜿㿱は)) [Rules on the Administration of Labor 
Dispatch of Guangdong Province (Comment Draft)], Guangdong Provincial People’s 
Government, Feb. 1, 2012, available at www.fzb.gd.gov.cn (last visited May 1, 2014); 
Liaoning Labor Regulations, supra note 131. 
164. Renshibu Laodong Guanxisi Fuze Tongzhi Jiu “Laowu Paiqian Zanxing Guiding” 
Youguan Wenti Da Jizhe Wen (Ӫһ䜘ࣣࣘޣ㌫ਨ䍏䍓਼ᘇቡǉࣣ࣑⍮䚓Ჲ㹼㿴ᇊǊᴹޣ
䰞仈ㆄ䇠㘵䰞) [MOHRSS Labor Relations Division Representative Answers Reporters’ 
Questions on the Labor Dispatch Interim Provisions] (Jan. 26, 2014). 
165. For example, some commentators note that when Congress adopted the 
1935 Wagner Act, which governs collective bargaining, it did so “[not out of] a 
conception of social justice, [but rather] tied its observations on inequality to economic 
2014] RECURSIVITY OF REFORM 1011 
and further current economic reform goals. According to the 
official commentary that accompanied the initial draft 
amendments, their specific objectives were: 
(i) To bring into strict order the use of labor dispatch 
workers [so that] they do not become the primary mode of 
employment; (ii) to protect the status of the working class 
and guarantee the rights of labor dispatch workers, 
including the . . . right to “equal pay for equal work”; (iii) 
to strengthen labor dispatch agency management and the 
regulatory responsibility of the labor bureau; (iv) to regulate 
labor dispatch and necessary delegation, and appropriately 
handle problems that have emerged in the implementation 
of the [LCL] . . . and to achieve a stable transition.”166 
Together with their implementing rules, the amendments 
support these goals by tightening some of the broad concepts 
contained in the LCL amendments and setting clearer limits on 
the permitted scope of labor dispatch use. The implementing 
rules also respond to some of the key concerns of the business 
community by carving out from the labor dispatch rules an 
exemption for international secondment and secondment to 
perform services for a family or individual.167 The amendments 
took effect on July 1, 2013, and the implementing rules on 
March 1, 2014, although affected companies have until March 1, 
2016 to come into compliance with the most stringent 
requirements.168 
A. Labor Dispatch the Exception, Not the Rule 
As noted above, the primary goal of the LCL amendments 
is to restrict labor dispatch in order to increase stable 
employment and ensure that existing protections apply broadly 
across the economy. These concerns arise in the United States as 
                                                                                                                                               
concerns,” such as reducing strikes and industrial unrest. THE GLOBAL WORKPLACE: 
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE EMPLOYMENT LAW—CASES AND MATERIALS 10–11 
(Roger Blanpain et al. eds., 2007). 
166. See LCL Draft Amendment (supplemental explanations), supra note 98,  
para. I (explaining the goals of the amendments). 
167. Labor Dispatch Provisions, supra note 34, art. 36. 
168. LCL Amendments, supra note 2 (providing, however, that existing labor 
services agencies have until July 1, 2014 to comply with its registration requirements); 
Labor Dispatch Provisions, supra note 34, art. 28 (creating a two-year transition period 
for compliance with the new ten percent limit on labor dispatch hires). 
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well; employers have often relied on nonstandard workers 
precisely because they may lie beyond the bounds of existing 
statutory schemes. 169  This is possible under US federal law 
because the degree to which dispatched and other nonstandard 
workers enjoy the same protections as employees of the user 
firm is treated somewhat differently under the Fair Labor 
Standards Act (“FLSA”),170 which establishes wage, hour, and 
overtime standards, the Occupational Safety and Health Act 
(“OSHA”),171 the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(“ERISA”),172 the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”),173 
and federal anti-discrimination law.174 Most of these statutory 
regimes turn on whether an individual is properly considered an 
“employee,” and because no single definition or legal test has 
emerged, the determination of whether an individual is entitled 
to protection under the statutes may vary depending on the 
applicable standard.175 
Similarly, employers in China have been able to capitalize 
on the ambiguities inherent in the LCL’s labor dispatch rules. 
Accordingly, one of the most significant changes introduced in 
the 2013 amendments is the amendment of Article 66, which 
had stated that labor dispatch shall “generally” (yiban ୍⯡) be 
used for “temporary” (linshixing ᷜ㖞⿏), “auxiliary” (fuzhuxing 
弭≑⿏), or “substitute” (daitixing ௦᭰ᛶ) positions. A new 
clause deletes the word “generally” and emphasizes that 
“[direct] contract-based employment is the basic employment 
model of the PRC” and that “[l]abor dispatch is supplemental 
and shall only be used” for these three types of positions.176  
                                                                                                                                               
169. MARION G. CRAIG ET AL, WORK LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 67 (2010). 
170. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012). 
171. §§ 651–678.  
172. Pub. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 29 
U.S.C.) . 
173.  §§ 151–169 . 
174. The primary federal anti-discrimination laws are the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 
29 U.S.C. §§ 201, 206 (2012); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
2000e-2000e-17 (2012); and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 
(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2012). 
175 . See Befort, supra note 19, at 166–69 (surveying the primary tests for 
determining employment status—the control test, the “economic realities” test applied 
under the FLSA, and the hybrid common law test that has been applied in Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) cases). 
176. LCL Amendments, supra note 2, para. 3 (amending LCL, art. 66) (author’s 
translation). 
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The revised LCL also narrows the scope of these so-called 
“three conditions.” Revised Article 66 specifies that “temporary” 
positions are those with a term of no more than six months, 
“auxiliary” positions are those that are not the primary business 
of the company but that serve positions within the primary 
business of the company, and “substitute” positions are those 
that replace standard employees while they have taken a leave of 
absence for full-time training, vacation, or other reasons.177 
Although the LCL’s implementing rules largely reiterate these 
definitions, the rules now follow an earlier approach adopted in 
Shanghai that allows the scope of “auxiliary” positions to be 
determined by collective consultation on an “equal” basis 
(pingdeng xieshang ᒣㅹॿ୶) with worker representatives or the 
union. 178    
Interestingly, the amendments leave unchanged potentially 
contradictory language in Article 62 of the LCL, which states 
that “in the case of continuous labor dispatch, the firm using 
dispatched labor shall implement a normal wage adjustment 
mechanism.”179  Some commentators had recommended that 
this provision be deleted to clarify that any non-temporary 
position must be reserved for a direct hire.180 The lack of any 
change to this clause suggests that “auxiliary” or “substitute” 
positions are not subject to the new six-month limit and that 
employers may legally use seconded workers for ongoing 
positions. 
The most dramatic step toward reducing the level of labor 
dispatch under the amended LCL is the introduction of 
                                                                                                                                               
177. LCL Amendments, supra note 2, para. 3.  This provision is consistent with 
Article 4 of the LCL, supra note 1, which requires employer rules concerning the 
interest of employees to be adopted only upon collective consultation with employee 
representatives.  The final implementing rules no longer contain proposed language 
that would have limited labor-dispatch to full-time positions. 
178.  Labor Dispatch Provisions, supra note 34, art. 3.  Guanyu Jinyibu Guifan Shi 
Guoziwei Xitong Guoyou Qiye Laowu Paiqian Yongong de Zhidao Yijian (ޣҾ䘋а↕
㿴㤳ᐲഭ䍴င㌫㔏ഭᴹԱъࣣ࣑⍮䚓⭘ᐕⲴᤷሬ᜿㿱) [Guiding Opinion on Progress 
toward Regulating Labor Dispatch Hiring by Municipal SOEs under SASAC 
Administration] art. 2, (promulgated by Shanghai State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission, No. 191, May 30, 2011) (authorizing municipal state-
owned enterprises to define the scope of the “three conditions” by collective 
negotiation). 
179. LCL, supra note 1, art. 62(5). 
180. See, e.g., China Labour Bulletin, supra note 156. 
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aggressive objective limit on labor dispatch, a concept that had 
been urged by the ACFTU during the drafting process. Under 
the amended LCL, firms must “strictly limit” the use of 
dispatched workers and keep hiring levels within a percentage 
of the total workforce that has now been set by the 
implementing rules.181 Although prior local rules had set limits 
nearer a 30 percent threshold, the implementing rules now state 
that employers the total number of dispatched workers in any 
position cannot exceed ten percent of the workforce.182  Firms 
have two years to comply with the new limits, and preexisting 
labor contracts and dispatch contracts will remain effective 
during this transition.183  Although proposed rules would have 
deemed workers in excess of the limits to be standard employees 
of the user firm, the final rules depend on administrative 
enforcement and simply state that no new dispatch hires can be 
made until this limit is met.184  The objective limits do not apply 
to foreign representative offices, which are required by law to 
hire exclusively through intermediaries, or to foreign 
secondment by domestic entities.185 
B. Equal Pay for Equal Work 
Another major change introduced in the LCL amendments 
and related implementing rules promotes pay parity for 
dispatched workers. In the United States, pay parity between 
                                                                                                                                               
181. LCL Amendments, supra note 22, para. 3 . 
182. Labor Dispatch Provisions, supra note 34, art. 4. The prior draft of the 
implementing rules had set a limit only for auxiliary positions; the present version is 
perhaps, more consistent with the underlying LCL amendments.  LCL Amendments, 
supra note 2, para. 3.  Prior local rules had limited all forms of labor dispatch to no 
more than thirty percent of the workforce. For example, Chongqing allowed temp 
workers to account for up to fifty percent of the workforce but required notice to the 
labor bureau if the percentage exceeded thirty percent. See Chongqing Regulation on 
the Protection of the Rights and Interests of Employees, supra note 134, art. 28. In 
Guangdong’s draft labor dispatch rules, the maximum was thirty percent, but notice 
was required if more than twenty persons or ten percent of the total workforce were 
temp workers. See Regulations on the Administration of Labour Dispatch of 
Guangdong Province, supra note 164, art. 12. To the extent existing limits do not 
conflict with those set nationally, they remain in effect. 
183. See Labor Dispatch Provisions, supra note 34, art. 28. 
184. The latter restriction will be extremely difficult to enforce in practice. 
185. See Labor Dispatch Provisions, supra note 34, arts. 25–26 (detailing general 
exceptions to the labor dispatch rules and further exemptions to the hiring 
limitations). 
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nonstandard workers and traditional employees has been 
proposed by academics, but is not yet a reality as a matter of 
law.186 In China as well, “equal pay for equal work” is a basic 
promise of the Labor Law that has proven difficult to enforce.187 
Interestingly, the LCL amendments simply repeat the original 
requirement in Article 63 of the LCL that dispatched workers 
receive “equal pay for equal work” and that the labor-using 
firm’s employees in similar positions must serve as the basis of 
comparison.188 As amended, Article 63 does add a requirement 
that both the labor contract entered into between a temp agency 
and a dispatched employee, and the sourcing services 
agreement entered into by the temp agency and the user firm, 
explicitly state that the promised compensation conforms to the 
statutory requirement. 189  In addition, amended Article 63 
requires employers to adopt the same compensation allocation 
method for temp hires as for direct employees. 190  These 
requirements may help ensure that any distinctions will be based 
not on status, but on a consistent and therefore more equitable 
methodology. 
The more significant change appears in the amendments’ 
implementing rules. Previously, approaches taken by local rules 
differed on whether “equal pay” required equal benefits as well. 
In addition, the finance rules mentioned earlier distinguish cash 
benefit payments, considered within the scope of “wages,” from 
social insurance withholding or other non-cash benefits.191 The 
implementing rules do not redefine “equal pay for equal work” 
or mandate equal benefits.  However, they now clearly provide 
that the user firm must “provide dispatched workers benefits 
                                                                                                                                               
186. See, e.g., Nancy Segal et al., Full-Time Rights for Part-Time Workers: Parity in 
Wages, Benefits, and Advancement Opportunities, 10 J. INDIV. EMP. RTS 245 (2002-03). 
187. Labor Law, supra note 4, art. 46. 
188. The implementing rules also base employee benefits on the user firm’s 
jurisdiction, reducing the risk of a “race to the bottom” across provinces. See Labor 
Dispatch Provisions, supra note 34, art. 18. 
189. LCL Amendments, supra note 2, para. 2. 
190. This requirement was absent in the initial draft amendments. See Draft 
Amendments, supra note 98. 
191. See also Finance Regulations, supra note 133 (requiring employers to account 
for bonuses, overtime wages, and other cash awards as wage expenses). There is some 
statutory support for this in the language of the LCL itself, which refers to wages and 
benefits in separate clauses. LCL, supra note 1, art. 62(2)–62(3). 
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related to their position without discriminating against them.192 
Given the rules’ omission of a  direct “equal benefits” 
requirement and the difficulty of litigating employment-related 
discrimination claims generally, employers may still enjoy cost 
savings by differentiating between standard employees and 
dispatched employees in terms of labor-related benefits and 
other incentives. However, the prohibition on discriminatory 
treatment makes such practices, if unjustified, a risk for the 
employer and may reduce the attractiveness of labor dispatch. 
C. Labor Contracts & Employment Stability 
Further changes to the LCL shore up existing rules that 
require hiring under a written employment contract. However, 
many labor dispatch agencies have not complied,  and lack of 
guidance on the temp agency’s right to terminate dispatched 
workers returned by the user firm has also undermined the 
LCL’s goals of promoting stable, longer-term employment. 
These implementation gaps have prompted a new phase of the 
recursive reform loop in the implementing rules of the 
amended LCL.  
In addition to setting new bounds on labor dispatch hiring, 
the implementing rules reiterate that dispatched workers must 
be hired under two-year written contracts and limit any 
probationary period to one term.193  They also promote clarity 
regarding compensation, other primary terms of the dispatch 
arrangement, and the allocation of responsibility by stipulating 
the minimum content of the labor services agreement with the 
user firm  
However, the rules seek to reduce arbitrary return of 
workers by user firms, clarifying that dispatched workers can 
only be returned to the temp agency in limited circumstances as 
provided under the LCL and that they are covered by existing 
provisions of the LCL that restrict dismissal for occupational 
disease or injury or certain other stated conditions.194 Under the 
LCL, employee terminations must be for cause, and the 
                                                                                                                                               
192. Labor Dispatch Provisions, supra note 34, art. 9. 
193 . Id. arts. 5–6.  This provision may make dispatched workers who are 
reassigned to a new user firm less attractive than first-time dispatched workers. 
194. Id. arts. 12–13. 
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implementing rules confirm that dispatched workers are 
covered by these rules and are also entitled to the same 
severance rights as standard workers if terminated.195  The rules 
also protect dispatched employees from termination if, upon 
return by a user firm, the temp agency can only offer work at a 
new user firm under lower terms and conditions. 196 
Unfortunately, the final rules omit proposed language that 
would have confirmed dispatched workers’ right to indefinite-
term contracts. 197   Nonetheless, these other measures are 
important steps to improve the job security originally promised 
to dispatched workers under the LCL.198 
D. Enforcement & Temp Agency Regulation 
Finally, the LCL amendments strengthen implementation 
by facilitating litigation by dispatched workers to challenge 
illegal practices as well as greater administrative oversight by 
local labor bureaus. Until the LCL amendments, no cases, to 
our knowledge, brought by labor dispatch employees succeeded 
in challenging either their unequal status at the workplace or 
the terms of employment. Courts could rely on the fact that 
employees had contractually agreed to serve as dispatch 
employees, and the LCL’s use of the term “generally” effectively 
barred any argument that the labor-using firm had exceeded 
statutory limits on labor dispatch. The lack of any formal 
registration for the labor services sector meant that regulators 
had no easy way to police violators or even to identify firms in 
the industry. 
                                                                                                                                               
195. Id. art. 17  
196. Id. art. 15  
197. Id. art. 8. As a result, some user firms have targeted long-term dispatched 
workers, some of whom had served for decades, for dismissal prior to the effective date 
of the new rules.  Guangtie Jituan Zhongzhi Laowugong Xuqian Fengbo: Xuduo Ren Yi 
Gongzuo Shinian (ᒯ䫱䳶ഒ㓸→ࣣ࣑ᐕ㔝ㆮ仾⌒˖䇨ཊӪᐢᐕ֌ॱᒤ [Guangzhou 
Railway Group Ends Dispatched Worker Contract Renewal Onslaught: Many Had Already 
Worked Ten Years], CCTV, Jan. 8, 2014. This gap does, however, leave space for local 
rules to adopt a different interpretation and extend this right to dispatched workers. 
 
198. See, e.g., LCL, supra note 1, art. 58 (requiring a two year labor contract with 
the labor dispatch agency and minimum wage when no work is available). 
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1. Private Enforcement 
Private enforcement by employees via litigation is 
complicated in every jurisdiction by the triangular contractual 
relationships inherent in hiring via an intermediary, unless 
applicable law clarifies the allocation of legal responsibility 
between the intermediary and the user firm. In the United 
States, for example, the Supreme Court has held that under the 
FLSA, the definition of “employer” and “employee” must be 
construed broadly, making it more likely that at least one, if not 
both, of the firms involved will bear legal liability for violations 
affecting temporary workers.199 In some cases, user firms and 
intermediaries may be deemed “joint employers” and thus 
jointly and severally liable for FLSA violations.200 
Article 92 of the LCL already stipulates that both the temp 
agency and the labor-using entity are jointly and severally liable 
for any harm to “the rights and interests” of temp hires. The 
amendments’ implementing rules now limit opportunities for 
contractual risk-shifting by the temp agency and user firm by 
more clearly delineating the obligations of labor dispatch firms 
toward dispatched workers, particularly with regard to 
occupational disease or injury.201  They also create the potential 
for compensatory damages if firms illegally hire dispatched 
workers.202  Unfortunately, as discussed below, the final rules 
eliminate proposed mechanisms that would have more directly 
incentivized labor using firms to comply with the law and to 
monitor temp agency compliance.203 
                                                                                                                                               
199. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012) (defining 
employer as “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in 
relation to an employee” (emphasis added)); Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 
U.S. 318, 326 (1992) (holding that the terms “employer” and “employee” must be 
construed expansively under the FLSA). Courts define these terms by applying a four-
factor “economic reality” test. Baker v. Flint Eng’g & Const. Co., 137 F.3d 1436, 1440 
(10th Cir. 1998). The factors are “whether the alleged employer (1) has the power to 
hire and fire employees, (2) supervises and controls employee work schedules or 
conditions of employment, (3) determines the rate and method of payment, and (4) 
maintains employment records.” Id. at 1440. 
200. See Stone, Atypical Employees, supra note 12, at 259 (discussing this common 
law gloss on the FLSA). 
201. Labor Dispatch Provisions, supra note 34, arts. 8–10, 20 (discussing temp 
agency and user firm obligations). 
202. Id. at 22.  
203. These provisions are discussed infra, Part III.C.    
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2. Regulatory Oversight & Administrative Enforcement 
The LCL amendments also toughen standards for 
establishing a temp agency and to some extent raise the 
penalties for violations. The most important change in temp 
agency oversight is the requirement that all temp agencies 
obtain an administrative license from the labor bureau and 
register as a temp agency with the local office of the 
Administration of Industry and Commerce (“AIC”).204 This rule 
should enable local labor bureaus to distinguish legal and illegal 
temp agencies and exercise closer administrative oversight. 
The amended LCL also raises the registered capital 
requirements for temp agencies to RMB¥2 million, double what 
was proposed in the draft amendments. These rules are 
intended to ensure that sufficient funds have been invested to 
enable the company to cover the basic obligations associated 
with its business.205 All temp agencies must also have a fixed 
place of business and implement a labor dispatch management 
system.206 The fact that these basic business practices had to be 
mandated by law hints none-too-subtly at the cavalier way that 
many temp agencies have been operating. 
Article 92 now authorizes labor bureau authorities to 
confiscate any illegal income generated by an unlicensed temp 
agency and, in addition, to impose a fine of between one and 
five times any income generated, or up to RMB¥50,000 
(US$8155) for those without illegal income. The potential fines 
that can be imposed on a temp agency or the firm that uses 
dispatched workers have also been raised from RMB¥1000–5000 
per employee to between RMB¥5000 and RMB¥10,000. 
Ultimately, a temp agency can, in addition to a fine, lose its 
labor dispatch license for serious violations.207 Consistent with 
China’s Administrative Penalties Law, however, penalties are 
                                                                                                                                               
204. LCL Amendments, supra note 2, para. 1. The permitting regulations have 
already been issued by the MOHRSS. MOHRSS, Guanyu Zuohao Laowu Paiqian 
Xingzheng Xuke Gongzuo de Tongzhi (ޣҾڊྭࣣ࣑⍮䚓㹼᭯䇨ਟᐕ֌Ⲵ䙊⸕) 
[Notice on the Effective Implementation of Labor Dispatch Administrative Permit 
Work], (promulgated. June 21, 2013, effective. July 1, 2013). 
205. LCL Amendments, supra note 2, art. 92. 
206. Similar rules have been adopted by Mexico in its revised Ley Federal de 
Trabajo [hereinafter Federal Labor Law], amended by Diario Oficial de la Federación 
[DOF], Nov. 30, 2012 (Mex.),. 
207. LCL Amendments, supra note 2, art. 92. 
1020 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 37:973 
only imposed if the firm fails to correct the violation when 
ordered to do so. Moreover, a temp agency operating illegally 
would be able to retain its business license and continue provide 
other services besides labor dispatch, such as consulting, within 
its approved scope of business. This rule strikes a reasonable 
compromise between tougher oversight of temp agencies and 
tailoring the penalty in a way that minimizes collateral impact on 
the labor services industry. 
III. WINDING DOWN RECURSIVE CYCLES: MAKING LABOR 
LAW WORK 208 
As Part II explains, the LCL amendments to no small extent 
retrace familiar territory, closing loopholes that have created a 
two-tiered system of regulation—one for standard hires and one 
for dispatched workers. They allow employers to rely on labor 
service agencies to make more efficient adjustments to 
production capacity but reaffirm that basic wage and contract 
protections should apply to all workers, regardless of status. 
Since it is now at least the third time that some of these basic 
requirements have made their way into national legislation, an 
obvious question is whether the prospects for a shift in employer 
practice are any better. In other words, will the reform “work,” 
or will it lead to another attempt down the road? 
The theory of recursivity articulated by Halliday and 
Carruthers offers a basic framework for understanding what 
might constitute a “successful” reform cycle. To be sure, their 
work emphasizes the cyclical process itself as the key to norm 
formation rather than a particular outcome. However, where, as 
here, the basic goals for the reform are fairly constant over time 
from the standpoint of the state (and of employees), a successful 
reform cycle should narrow regulatory distance by producing 
new (subjective, internalized) norms that better conform 
external behavior to the “law on the books.” As a result, later 
legislative reforms would be focused more on marginal, rather 
than fundamental changes, and would no longer need to 
introduce new penalties or other incentives for the same 
conduct unless the underlying policy goals or substantive rules 
                                                                                                                                               
208. This heading is inspired in part by Sean Cooney’s 2006 survey of labor law 
enforcement challenges. Cooney, supra note 7. 
2014] RECURSIVITY OF REFORM 1021 
change. The reform would in essence “wind down,” with fewer, 
and more narrowly focused, reform iterations. 
Since the implementation phase for the LCL amendments 
is only beginning at the time of this writing, our goal here is to 
consider the likelihood of the amendments’ success in winding 
down the recursive cycle based on an expansion of Halliday and 
Carruthers’ model. The factors they identify as part of the 
recursive process point to an initial hypothesis: to the extent that 
the reforms succeed in reducing (i) indeterminacy, (ii) ideological and 
structural contradictions among those charged with making and 
implementing the law, (iii) diagnostic difference, and (iv) actor 
mismatch, they are likely to “wind down” the recursive cycle by 
narrowing its scope, frequency, and length. 
However, as discussed above, the literature on regulatory 
compliance suggests that two other features are important in 
explaining or perhaps predicting the potential length and scope 
of recursive cycles: (i) the compliance motivations of those 
whose behavior is targeted by the new measures, such as 
employees, temp agencies, and user firms; and (ii) regulatory 
distance—again, the gap between the law on the books and the 
norms of conduct that are evident at the start of a reform cycle 
in the target communities. As reforms proceed, changing 
compliance motivations will, of course, shift dominant norms 
and set a new starting point against which the regulatory 
distance of later recursive cycles will be measured. Ayres’ and 
Braithwaites’ seminal research on incentive structures and 
compliance suggests that a mix of regulatory approaches will 
ultimately be more successful than either compliance-oriented 
or deterrence-oriented approaches, applied in isolation, in 
incentivizing compliance and reducing regulatory distance in 
later reform cycles.209 
Adding compliance incentives and regulatory distance to 
the mix suggests a second hypothesis: recursive cycles will increase 
in number, length, and scope, taking longer to wind down, if (x) 
regulatory distance at the start of a given reform cycle is large, (y) 
compliance motivations are weak, or (z) Halliday and Carruthers’ four 
primary mechanisms result in greater regulatory distance as reform 
cycles proceed. Where these factors pull in different directions, we 
                                                                                                                                               
209. See generally AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 6. 
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might expect to see recursive loops expanding and contracting, 
lengthening or shortening, over time. 
This Part draws on these hypotheses to frame an analysis of 
the likely impact of the reforms. We conclude that the LCL 
amendments make clear strides toward reducing indeterminacy, 
incentivizing compliance, and engaging relevant actors in the 
law-making and implementation phase. All of these 
improvements should wind down the recursive process; 
however, they are unlikely to end the cycle, given remaining 
ideological and structural contradictions and the continued 
indeterminacy of some of the rules themselves. This Part 
concludes by proposing measures that might further reduce 
indeterminacy and wind down the recursive cycle if 
incorporated into new national and local rules.210 
A. Contradictions & Diagnostic Struggles 
Each phase of labor reform thus far reflects the resolution 
of deep diagnostic struggles and ideological contradictions that 
played out during the drafting process. These unresolved 
tensions are the most significant factor likely to hamper the 
impact of the LCL amendments and drive a new reform cycle. 
Terence Halliday and legal sociologist Sida Liu’s empirical work 
anticipates this. They suggest that the four core recursivity 
drivers or mechanisms may be temporally linked in stages of 
legal change: underlying ideological and structural 
contradictions produce ambiguities and inconsistencies in the 
law, and the resulting indeterminacy leads to conflicting 
interpretations and diagnostic struggles among those charged 
with implementation or compliance, driving further 
indeterminacy later in the recursive process.211 
                                                                                                                                               
210. One of the authors has previously presented some of these recommendations 
in Huang Qiaoyan, Xianyou Faluxia Xihua Laowu Paiqian Yonggong Fangshi de 
Guifan Yaoqiu (⧠ᴹ⌅ᖻл㓶ॆࣣ࣑⍮䚓⭘ᐕᯩᔿⲴ㿴㤳㾱≲) [A Call for More Detailed 
Regularization of Labor Dispatch Under Current Law], CHINA LABOR, June 2012, at 29–31.  
The fact that the implementing rules have been designated as “provisional” does not 
mean that further revisions are imminent.  However, local regulations may be revised 
and can impose tighter limits or create compliance incentives not present at the 
national level.  
211. See generally Liu & Halliday, supra note 9, at 943 (applying the recursivity 
framework to the ongoing reform of China’s Criminal Procedure Law). 
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Admittedly, the adoption of new rules at the national level 
in the Labor Law, the LCL, and the recent amendments can be 
expected to reduce ideological contradictions by 
communicating the policy priority placed on the reforms. The 
opportunity for public participation during the comment 
process might also be expected to improve the quality of the 
reforms and reduce actor mismatch, again, the gap between 
lawmakers and those charged with implementation. 
Unfortunately, structural contradictions pose greater 
problems. Local labor bureaus are already hampered by long-
standing institutional and capacity constraints, in some respects 
not unlike those faced by their US counterparts.212 The recent 
explosion in the sheer number of temp agencies and dispatched 
workers has only exacerbated these limits. 213  Many of the 
widespread abuses of labor dispatch could be addressed simply 
by enforcing the existing mandates in the LCL, so changes in 
enforcement practice are essential if the amendments are to 
have any impact. 
However, tough enforcement of the amendments is likely 
to be complicated by the competing views of agencies within the 
state bureaucracy on the seriousness of the problem and by the 
challenges of transitioning improperly hired dispatched workers 
and those hired above the ten percent authorized maximum 
into standard positions. 214  Of particular concern is the 
opposition of the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Commission (“SASAC”), the administrative 
agency that oversees state enterprises, to the draft amendments, 
                                                                                                                                               
212. See David Weil & Amanda Pyles, Why Complain? Complaints, Compliance, and the 
Problem of Enforcement in the U.S. Workplace, 27 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 59, 82 (2005) 
(identifying limits of the United States’ complaint-driven enforcement of wage and 
hour and occupational safety and health laws). 
213. On enforcement challenges generally, see Cooney, supra note 7, at 789. 
Media reports continue to document their persistence. See, e.g., Zhongguo Laodong 
Jiancha Zhifa Quanli Xiangdang Weiruo, Yuanyuan Ganbushang Chengguan (ѝഭࣣࣘⴁሏ
ᢗ⌅ᵳ࣋⴨ᖃᗞᕡˈ䘌䘌䎦нк෾㇑) [China’s Labor Inspection Enforcement Authority is 
Particularly Weak and Can’t Match the Public Order Authority], LIAOWANG XINWEN 
ZHOUKAN [OUTLOOK WEEKLY], Feb. 26, 2011. 
214. See IHLO Report, supra note 43 (citing MOHRSS regulations that encourage 
state-owned enterprises and other public institutions to establish regularization plans 
but reporting that these have not been widely followed).  The new implementing rules 
require firms to file such a transition plan with the relevant labor bureau.  See Labor 
Dispatch Provisions, supra note 34, art. 28. 
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which were backed by the ACFTU,215 and the state sector’s heavy 
dependence on labor dispatch. The MOHRSS itself was not a 
strong supporter of the ACFTU’s positions because the ministry 
also oversees its own employment service agencies, such as the 
various Foreign Enterprise Service Corporations. The 
embeddedness of the labor administration as a market player in 
the labor services sector and SASAC’s resistance to the changes 
mean that local labor authorities are likely to tread softly in 
implementing the new rules. Although the new permitting rules 
should enable local labor bureaus to exercise better oversight, 
enforcement of the labor dispatch rules will likely continue to 
depend largely on employee self-help and individual or 
collective litigation. 
B. Reducing Indeterminacy 
Another key reason why recursivity is to some extent 
inevitable with respect to regulations on labor dispatch is the 
inherent ambiguity of the dispatched labor model. As one 
commentator writing on temporary labor in Canada put it, “the 
triangular nature of the relationship . . . creates a structural 
tendency toward under-enforcement of existing standards, given 
the potential for confusion, conflict, or outright obfuscation 
concerning the division of [legal] responsibilities between the 
client user and the agency.”216 And of course, laws of general 
applicability cannot foreclose every potential area of ambiguity 
or anticipate every potential variation in circumstance—nor 
would it necessarily be desirable to do so.217 Implementation 
therefore requires some degree of deference to the discretion of 
firm managers and enforcement authorities. 
Examples in the LCL are the terms “equal pay,” 
“discrimination” with regard to benefits, and the definition of 
“equivalent position” for purposes of the equal pay 
                                                                                                                                               
215. Opposition from the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission (“SASAC”) because of the heavy reliance of SOEs on temp workers 
reportedly slowed the drafting process of the LCL amendments. See Growing Demand, 
supra note 40, at 16; IHLO Report, supra note 43. 
216. Bartkiw, supra note 21, at 173. 
217. See BARDACH & KAGAN, supra note 142, at 58-77, 84–89 (discussing variation 
among regulated enterprises, the difficulty of calibrating regulations to avoid over- or 
under-inclusiveness, and the inevitability of compliance gaps). 
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requirement, all of which are still open to broad construction by 
the employer. With regard to the latter, it is difficult to envision 
how a narrower standard might be drafted that could apply 
broadly across the economy. Many employers have responded to 
the amended LCL by segregating temp and direct hire positions 
in different work units to reduce the number of positions for 
which an exact equivalent can be found. The amendments also 
fail to respond to abusive practices that exploit part-time and 
probationary workers,218 so tougher limits on labor dispatch may 
cause employers to stretch the definition of probationary or 
part-time work as limits on labor dispatch tighten. 
C. Incentives & Regulatory Distance 
Although missing from recursivity theory as originally 
developed, the experience of Chinese labor law suggests that the 
compliance incentives before and after a recursive cycle and the 
regulatory distance reflected by the reform will also determine 
the length and extent of the next recursive loop. For example, if 
current reforms improve compliance incentives and succeed in 
shifting norms closer toward the letter and spirit of the new 
reforms, later reform cycles may be narrower in scope and more 
acceptable to the target population, that is, they may exhibit a 
shorter regulatory distance from the reality on the ground. This 
virtuous cycle will then be more likely to wind down rather than 
extend the cycles of recursive reform. 
The relative cost of labor dispatch and standard hiring is 
one of the most important determinants of employers’ 
compliance incentives, and tighter regulatory limits will almost 
certainly make labor dispatch more expensive. Most obviously, 
the ten percent cap on the proportion of labor dispatch hires 
and the prohibition on discriminatory benefits is likely to 
increase employer costs, perhaps significantly.219  Even with the 
two-year phase-in period, the cap also represents a high degree 
of regulatory distance and may be difficult for many employers 
to meet.  It is also likely that, at least in the short term, the new 
                                                                                                                                               
218 . See Harper Ho, supra note 62, at 92 (discussing illegally extended 
probationary terms as a response to the LCL). 
219 . Any impact will of course be greatest in those sectors where the 
implementing rules cap is set substantially lower than actual pre-amendment temp 
hiring levels. 
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requirements for temp agencies will push some out of the 
market entirely, increasing market concentration and reducing 
competition. Notwithstanding the benefits to workers from the 
exit of “gray market” temp agencies (and the benefits to 
government-affiliated temp agencies of reduced competition), 
consolidation could raise the cost of temp hiring.220  
Whether these shifts will increase standard employment, 
and the ultimate effect on total employment, are, as yet, 
unknown. However, a recent study by Gallagher et al. has found 
that aggregate employment levels in China since the LCL’s 
passage in 2008 have proven quite robust in the face of its tough 
new standards and tightened enforcement. 221  Empirical 
evidence from a study of similar reforms enacted in South Korea 
in 2007 also suggests that restricting labor dispatch may lead to 
sustained declines in temp hiring without a long-term adverse 
effect on total employment levels across the economy. 222 
However, some of the findings of these studies may be explained 
both as the result of employers learning to adjust to the new 
rules and, more pessimistically, of employers finding new 
avenues to evade them.223 
Another reason why a dramatic shift in current practice 
(which might narrow the regulatory distance of future reforms) 
may, however, not emerge has to do with what is not included in 
the amendments. For example, the final implementing rules do 
not include proposed language that would have required 
employers to count dispatched workers as employees for 
regulatory purposes.  Although this was perhaps deemed 
unnecessary in light of the ten percent cap on labor dispatch, 
the omission gives some firms continued incentive to use labor 
dispatch to improve firm performance measures.  Second, 
                                                                                                                                               
220. Industry consolidation has been predicted by a number of commentators. 
See, e.g., Andy Yeo, Duncan A.W. Abate, Hong Tran, & Helen Liao, Proposed Amendments 
to the PRC Employment Contract Law (Mayer-Brown Client Alert, Nov. 20, 2012). 
221. See Gallagher et al., supra note 30, at 23. 
222. See generally, Yoo & Kang, supra note 16, at 592. This study found that trends 
in temp and standard hiring followed U-shaped curves; an initial decline in temp hiring 
persisted two years after the reforms began, and that an initial parallel increase in 
standard hires and overall employment in the first few years was not sustained, but did 
not decline either. Id. 
223. Id. at 579–80, 598–02. 
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tougher objective standards initially proposed by the ACFTU224 
would have moved beyond the aggregate cap on labor dispatch 
and entirely banned the use of dispatched workers in certain 
sectors, such as coal mining, that are inherently hazardous. 
Similar measures in the European Union allow member states to 
adopt bans on the use of short-term or dispatched workers in 
positions that pose a danger to safety or health.225 This type of 
restriction would reduce ambiguity and would not be likely to 
increase regulatory distance; in fact, the rule would better 
conform to measures that have already been adopted by some 
provincial governments.226 Industries that require professional 
qualifications or permits from a professional organization or 
agency, such as law, medicine, journalism, and accounting, also 
should not be allowed to use dispatched workers.227 Ethical 
concerns about client confidentiality, the challenge of 
confirming professional licensure for dispatched employees, the 
negative impact of short-term positions and high turnover on 
service quality, and the fact that temp agencies are simply not 
qualified to bear the responsibility, as the legal employer, for 
such professionals, all support clear bans on temp hires in these 
sectors. Future regulations should consider such limits for 
certain industries.  
The implementing rules’ drafters realized that the impact 
of the amendments is likely to be moderated by the availability 
of outsourcing as an alternative model if employers simply 
contract out work previously performed by dispatched workers. 
Outsourcing is attractive because it allows employers to enjoy 
                                                                                                                                               
224. There is some evidence to suggest that political compromise between the 
ACFTU, their primary backer, and strong interests in the state sector and even in the 
labor administration might have prevented some of these more comprehensive reforms 
from being adopted. See IHLO Report, supra note 43 (noting the ACFTU had 
previously proposed such a change). 
225. See Bronstein, supra note 22, at 208 (discussing the negative impacts of 
temporary work). 
226.  See, e.g., Shanxisheng Meikuang Gongyeju Guanyu Meikuangjing Xia Yanjin 
Shiyong Laowu Paiqian Renyuan de Tongzhi (ኡ㾯ⴱ➔ⸯᐕъተޣҾ➔ⸯӅлѕ⾱֯
⭘ࣣ࣑⍮䚓ӪઈⲴ䙊⸕) [Shanxi Coal Mining Industry Bureau Notice on Strictly 
Prohibiting the Use of Labor Dispatch for Mine Workers] (No凞 凞 1529 promulgated  
Jan. 23, 2010). 
227. The initial LCL implementing rules issued in 2008 confirm that the labor 
dispatch rules extend to these fields. LCL Implementing Provisions, supra note 118, art. 
3. 
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many of the same cost and risk-shifting advantages as indirect 
hiring via a temp agency, and many Chinese companies have 
already responded to the LCL amendments by substituting 
outsourced workers for those previously sourced through labor 
service agencies. 228  Although empirical evidence on the 
magnitude of any shift is not yet available, the amendments’ 
implementing rules attempt to curtail this trend by bringing 
independent contracting and other outsourcing relationships 
within the scope of the labor dispatch rules if the company uses 
a “labor dispatch hiring model”; in other words, if the direct 
employer is not the firm for which the worker provides 
services. 229  Of course, this concept itself is likely to foster 
competing interpretations, which may limit its effectiveness. 
In addition, the amendments’ implementing rules fail to 
include proposed provisions that would have put a heavier 
burden on user firms to monitor temp agencies.  For example, 
the proposed rules would have stipulated that the user firm 
would be deemed the legal employer of the worker in the event 
the labor services agency failed to enter into an employment 
contract with the dispatched worker or if the user firm hired 
dispatched workers in excess of the legal limits on labor 
dispatch.230 Innovative incentives for self-regulation like these 
are already part of the LCL itself and can be credited for its 
success in motivating employers to comply with the employment 
contract mandate. This approach was also adopted in Mexico’s 
recent labor law reform, 231  and in China, as well, by local 
governments in Liaoning and Chongqing.232   If other local 
governments were to follow suit, employers would incur 
                                                                                                                                               
228. This observation is based on the personal experience of one of the authors. 
229. Labor Dispatch Provisions, supra note 34, art. 27. 
230. Aug. 8, 2013 Draft Labor Dispatch Regulations, arts. 14, 23, 37. 
231. See Federal Labor Law, supra note 206, art. 13-16 (putting the burden on the 
firm hiring outsourced workers and independent contractors to monitor any 
contractor or temp agency’s legal compliance by making both firms jointly and 
severally liable for any violation; the hiring firm may also risk the outsourced workers’ 
being considered standard full-time employees of the firm). 
232. Liaoning Labor Regulations, supra note 134, art. 30 (deeming dispatched 
employees to be direct hires if the user firm fails to execute a contract with the temp 
agency). C.f. with Chongqing Labor Regulations, supra note 4, art. 30. Chongqing 
modifies this list to include circumstances where the labor-using firm hires more than 
fifty percent of its workforce via labor dispatch or uses temp hires for longer than two 
years. Id. 
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additional monitoring costs, but overall compliance would be 
expected to improve significantly.  The rule would also 
encourage dispatched workers to play an active role in enforcing 
the LCL through litigation, which has proven to be a powerful 
force motivating changes in employer practice since the initial 
passage of the LCL.233  Concerns about the additional burden 
on employers and the courts may explain why this rule was not 
adopted in the new implementing rules,  
Of course, some level of evasion of the LCL is perhaps 
inevitable because many of the underlying challenges require a 
normative shift and are less susceptible of a legislative solution. 
One example is the heightened registered capital requirement. 
The LCL’s initial registered capital requirement (RMB¥500,000) 
was already a substantial increase over the pre-LCL level of 
RMB¥30,000 (then, the default under the Company Law). 
However, labor dispatch agencies were able to meet the new 
standards by borrowing funds in order to register the business 
and then draining the funds to repay the loan, leaving an empty 
shell.234 Without concentrated efforts by local authorities, or the 
introduction of some type of regulatory bonding or capital 
maintenance rule (itself presumably difficult to police), these 
practices are unlikely to change even though the new threshold 
has again been dramatically increased. 
Collective representation offers a potential solution to the 
limits of top-down implementation but one that is constrained 
in the Chinese context. Expanding avenues for active 
representation of temp agency workers through unionization, 
employee representative congresses, or participation in 
collective bargaining agreements have in fact been advanced by 
China’s national and local authorities in recent years. For 
example, rules issued in 2012 require both state and non-state 
employers to establish employee representative congresses 
(“ERC”) under existing trade unions. These rules reinforce 
                                                                                                                                               
233. See Gallagher et al., supra note 30, at 9–10 (reporting some evidence that 
managers perceive enforcement to have toughened since 2008 and linking improved 
compliance in part to the heightened risk of employee litigation). One of the great 
successes of the LCL, for example, was the strong incentives it created for employers to 
enter into written employment contracts by stipulating that a worker serving without 
one could be entitled to double damages and ultimately, deemed an indefinite term 
hire as a matter of law. 
234. 60 Million Temp Workers’ Rights, supra note 98. 
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existing provisions on workplace representation under China’s 
Company Law and local rules, and they require, for the first 
time, that the ERC include representatives of dispatched 
workers.235 
However, because these measures depend on the viability of 
the union itself, they have been seen as more of a public policy 
statement than a firm requirement, and dispatched workers, as 
well as many standard employees, do not yet have effective 
avenues for workplace participation and collective voice. As in 
the West, unionization levels are low for temporary workers, and 
in China, some have been illegally barred from joining the trade 
union of the labor-using firm.236 Some provincial trade union 
federations are working to expand temp agency unionization 
with aggressive targets.237 The ACFTU is also increasing efforts to 
expand collective consultation at the regional and industry level 
that would cover temp agencies and labor dispatch workers. 
However, efforts to transform existing unions into true vehicles 
for worker voice continue to meet strong resistance from 
employers and skepticism by employees.238 
D. The Benefits of Recursivity 
The implicit assumption behind our discussion thus far has 
been that recursivity should be reduced or eliminated. While 
this would mean that employer practice has begun to conform 
                                                                                                                                               
235 . See ACFTU et al. Qiye Minzhu Guanli Guiding (Աъ≁ѫ㇑⨶㿴ᇊ) 
[Provisions on the Democratic Management of Enterprises] art. 9 (issued and effective 
Feb. 13, 2012).  The ERC is a separate body from the trade union, which is responsible 
for its operation. 
236. See IHLO Report, supra note 43(citing statistics from a 2011 study of the 
Shanghai Municipal Federation of Trade Unions, the China Enterprise Council (CEC), 
and the MOHRSS reporting that only forty percent of all temp agencies are 
unionized); Growing Demand, supra note 40, at 16 (reporting on the use of temp 
workers at a Nokia factory in Dongguan, a major manufacturing center in 
Guangdong); cf. Waas, supra note 16, at 59 (reporting that the unionization rate of 
temporary workers in Europe is low); Danielle D. van Jaarsveld, Overcoming Obstacles to 
Worker Representation: Insights from the Temporary Agency Workforce, 50 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 
355 (2005-06) (surveying barriers to temporary worker organization in the United 
States). 
237 . See DONGGUAN DAILY, supra note 142 (reporting on sixty-five percent 
unionization rate targets in Guangdong). 
238. See Cooney et al., supra note 78, at 795–96 (discussing opposition of the 
business community to provisions in the draft LCL that might have given unions veto 
power over workplace rules). 
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more closely to the demands of positive law, the continuation of 
recursive cycles also offers a number of hidden benefits that 
should be emphasized. First, the repetition of provisions 
contained in earlier legislation during later recursive cycles 
brings to light elements of the earlier reform that require 
renewed policy emphasis and enforcement focus. As has been 
widely recognized in the literature, the expressive effect of law 
can be a powerful force in reshaping compliance incentives over 
time, and the reiteration of existing standards serves this 
function.239 
Second, longer recursive cycles can give time for regulatory 
distance to narrow.240 Policy tools that promote incrementalism, 
such as transition periods, grandfathering, and phase-ins, are all 
valuable policy tools for this reason.241  The two-year phase-in 
period for the ten percent limit on dispatched workers is an 
obvious example in the amendments’ implementing rules and 
was intended to reduce the immediate impact of the rules on 
unemployment, production levels, and labor relations. 242  Of 
course, longer recursive cycles may also reflect deficiencies in 
the underlying legislation and offer opportunity for 
retrenchment, feeding the next recursive cycle. However, the 
recursive nature of this process allows regulators and regulatees 
to adjust to the requirements; successive expressions of the rule 
will then respond to changes in the enforcement context and in 
dominant norms among regulatees. 
The history of labor law reform in China illustrates many of 
the benefits of recursivity, despite the obstacles to 
implementation that have been amply documented over the 
past several decades. For example, many firms initially ignored 
the Labor Law’s basic contracting rules and flaunted its 
                                                                                                                                               
239. On the expressive function of law, see, for example, Cass R. Sunstein, Law, 
Economics, & Norms: On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996); 
Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy: A Comment on the 
Symposium, 89 MICH. L. REV. 936, 938–39 (1991). 
240. Certainly, if reforms are ineffective, recursive cycles may create greater 
opportunity for evasion and resistance to build. 
241. The LCL amendments provide that preexisting contracts will remain valid 
but must be amended to conform to the equal pay requirement. Employers already 
using dispatch workers and temp agencies who lack the required permit or business 
license have one year from the effective date to comply with the new requirements. 
LCL Amendments, supra note 2. 
242 . See MOHRSS, supra note 164. 
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prohibitions on abusive workplace practices, but a decade later, 
by the time the LCL was passed, regulatory distance had begun 
to narrow. Rising awareness of legal rights, space for bottom-up 
enforcement, changes in public enforcement priorities, political 
dynamics, and shifting market conditions with the LCL’s passage 
all shaped this process, and all of these factors go some way in 
explaining the progress that has been achieved in the 
implementation of the LCL. Similarly, in 2008, labor dispatch 
gave “breathing room” for firms pressed by the financial crisis 
and a more litigious workforce to adjust. Now, the LCL 
amendments foreclose labor dispatch as an automatic 
alternative to full compliance, measures that would have 
represented a vast regulatory distance if adopted during the 
earlier recursive cycle and might have driven more overt 
resistance from the business community. With greater clarity of 
legal responsibility and a narrower regulatory distance at the 
present time, prospects for effective implementation of the new 
rules on labor dispatch may be brighter. 
CONCLUSION 
China is only one of many governments to introduce new 
measures on dispatched workers in the past decade, reforms 
that represent a clear retreat from the wholesale deregulation 
and expansive approach toward nonstandard workers that 
characterized earlier eras. Most have been put into place since 
the start of the financial crisis. The 2008 European Union 
Directive on Temporary Agency Work, for example, is designed 
to “ensure the protection of temporary agency workers . . . by 
ensuring that the principle of equal treatment [extends] to 
temporary agency workers, and by recognizing temporary work 
agencies as employers.”243 South Korea enacted its reforms in 
2007,244 and Mexico passed a major reform of its Federal Labor 
                                                                                                                                               
243. Directive 2008/104/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on 
Temporary Agency Work, Nov. 19, 2008, 2008 O.J. (L237) 9, 11. See generally, Waas, 
supra note 16 (analyzing the Directive). 
244. See generally Yoo & Kang, supra note 16 (analyzing the reform’s effect on 
dispatched hiring). 
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Law in 2012 that includes many of the limits now incorporated 
in the amended LCL.245 
In the United States, as well, current debates over the 
future of health care and immigration reform, 
underemployment, and outsourcing have highlighted the 
importance of nonstandard employment in the economy. They 
have also sparked renewed attention among academics and 
policymakers to the social costs and benefits of nonstandard 
work. 246  Similar debates have engaged many governments 
around the world in the past decade, each having to adapt 
outdated legal forms to respond to the informalization of the 
workplace. 
The history of Chinese labor reform (and similar reforms in 
the West as well)247 suggests that when new rules have attempted 
to push companies to make significant changes far beyond the 
level of current practice, decades may be required for the 
reforms to take root. The LCL Amendments and their 
implementing rules represent at least the third iteration in this 
incremental process, and the lengthy transition period for their 
implementation recognizes this reality. This most recent 
experience underscores the utility of recursivity theory in 
describing the complexity and dynamism of cycles of lawmaking 
and implementation. It also emphasizes the relevance of new 
concepts—underlying incentive structures and regulatory 
distance—that might usefully be incorporated into future 
research on legal reform cycles. 
From a practical standpoint, the success of the latest 
reforms is particularly important at this point in China’s reform 
path as it works to develop a knowledge-driven, innovation-based 
economy and deal with vast socio-economic disparities that may 
pose a political threat to its leadership. Although the LCL 
amendments cannot entirely foreclose future avenues of evasion 
nor eliminate implementation barriers, the renewed effort to 
                                                                                                                                               
245. Although it now gives employers the ability to retain workers on the basis of 
seasonal or short-term contracts, the revised Federal Labor Law mandates written 
employment contracts, prohibits firms from hiring an entire workforce through 
intermediaries, and establishes other standards intended to make contracts for an 
indefinite term the predominant form. See Federal Labor Law, supra note 198. 
246. See, e.g. Will Obamacare Destroy Jobs? Health Reform May Make Americans Work 
Less, ECONOMIST, Aug. 24, 2013; Hill, supra note 151. 
247. For a few obvious examples, see supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text. 
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restore equality to dispatched workers and promote standard 
hiring is a clear step forward in addressing these concerns. Even 
if the amendments do not wind down the recursive cycle, they 
can at least narrow the regulatory distance that will confront the 
next phase of the reform process. They may also suggest lessons 
for legislators and policymakers elsewhere who will shape the 
future of labor and employment law to fit the needs of today’s 
changing workforce. 
 
